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 ABSTRACT 
This dissertation encompasses three related essays on US trade unions.  
Chapter 1 investigates union density differences across states and state-industry in 
the private sector. In the US, private sector union density varied sharply geographically. 
This essay examines the factors that contributed to the decline in unionization by 
exploiting variations at the state and state-industry level. It updates the literature that 
focused on the pre-1980 period, develops three new measures to gauge the effects of 
union activism and management opposition on unionization, and uses Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition to identify the major contributors to declining unionization rates. Ordinary 
Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares estimations are carried out for 1985, 1995, 
and 2005. State-industry estimation results show that union density varied directly with 
earnings, share of blue-collar workers, union activism, and urbanization rate, and 
inversely with female share, employer opposition, and Right-to-Work laws. Overall, our 
model confirms the findings of the previous studies and it verifies our choice of proxies 
for employer opposition and union activism.  
Chapter 2 investigates union density differences between Colorado and Utah in 
the public sector. Colorado and Utah experienced very different histories of change in 
union density during 1983-2008, despite their substantial similarities with respect to the 
determinants of unionization. This essay took a comparative analysis approach, because 
some of the phenomena that affect unionization are the state-specific characteristics and 
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are hard to quantify. The decline in public sector union density in Utah was due to 
changes in public attitudes, which led to a super majority control of government by the 
Republican Party and management’s resistance towards unions. 
Chapter 3 investigates the National Labor Relations Board member’s voting 
behavior on Unfair Labor Practice cases. Empirical studies show that the board members 
of the Democratic Party are more likely to vote pro-union and members of the 
Republican Party are more inclined to vote promanagement. This chapter utilized logistic 
regression and estimated factors that influence board members’ voting behavior during 
the 1993-2008 period. Our results confirm the findings of previous studies on board 
members’ voting behavior and, furthermore, they show that a newly introduced board 
member’s background variable has an immense impact on a board member’s voting 
behavior.  
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 Trade unions in the United States (US) have experienced large fluctuations in 
their membership rates. Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2006) identified three periods that 
separate the ups and downs of union density for the past 80 years. The first period marks 
the beginning of the Great Depression and ends in the early 1950s (1930-1954). This 
period experienced union density of slightly over 13 percent in 1935 to a high of 36 
percent by 1945, declining slightly through 1954 (34.9 percent). The union density 
decline accelerated during the second period (1955-1980). In this period, union density 
declined relative to the labor force, however, union membership was still climbing. In the 
third period, union density experienced its worst decline in history. Beginning in 1981 
through the present time, union density has declined relative to the labor force, and turned 
into an absolute decline in union memberships. In 2008, union density stood at 12.4 
percent, which is comparable to levels prior to the 1930s and less than the level in 1935. 
Variations in union density are not limited to time, but also exist among states and across 
industries. States and industries not only saw their union membership rates fluctuate over 
time, but there also existed huge differences between the states and industry unionization. 
For instance, in 2008, North Carolina‟s union density stood at 3.5 percent and New York 
at 24.9 percent or nearly seven times larger than union density in North Carolina (Hirsch 
and Mcpherson, 2009). In the public sector, union density experienced a very different 
history than the private sector. At the time when the private sector union membership rate  
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was thriving, there was little or no public sector unionization. When union density in the 
private sector was dropping in the 1960s and 1970s, public sector union density was 
flourishing and surpassing the levels of private sector unionization. In 2008, public sector 
union density stood at 37 percent, which was nearly three times that of private sector 
unionization.    
Union membership rate is an indication of a union‟s strength vis-a-vis employers 
and affects labor-management relations in the labor market. In the period of 1980-2008, 
unions lost much of their strength and members due to the factors that have been the 
subject of many studies in the field of social sciences including economics. Economists 
are interested in union density for the following reasons. First, unions raise wages in the 
unionized firms in comparison to the nonunionized firms. Employers in the unionized 
firms complained that they could not compete with the low cost nonunion firms and 
opposed the union‟s organizing drives, which led to unfair labor practices during 
organizing drives. Second, profits in the unionized firms were lower than in the nonunion 
firms, which gave employers yet another reason to oppose the unions organizing 
activities. Third, on a positive note, unions reduce worker turnover and make 
management more efficient by voicing worker‟s concerns with workplace conditions and 
management treatment, which leads to higher productivity in unionized firms. However, 
restricted job descriptions by unions lower the productivity. Unionized workers are more 
informed about the health of the company that they work for and anticipate more in the 
firm‟s day- to-day operations. Finally, unions reduce the wage-gap in unionized firms and 
redistribute the income more evenly within the unionized firms. These and related issues 
affect the outcome in the labor market and have led economists to examine causes and 
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consequences of unions in the labor market. Freeman and Medoff (1984) stated that 
“unionization appears to improve rather than to harm the social and economic system.”  
This dissertation was inspired by these fluctuations and variations in union 
density over time and across states and industries. Although the three periods that were 
mentioned above offer different histories in unionization and previous studies have to 
some extent examined them, this dissertation limits its study to the period of 1980-2008. 
This period not only represents the worst decline in union membership rate, but also has 
some unique aspects. For instance, in this period, labor-management relations became 
more antagonistic than the prior three decades. The 1950s, 1960s, and the early 1970s 
were a period of cooperation between labor and management, which started to falter in 
the late 1970s. In the late 1970s a series of events led to a filibuster of a labor law bill by 
then junior Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). Labor unions realized that an update to the old 
labor laws that passed Congress in 1935 and were amended in 1947 was needed to 
combat employer opposition and thought that the old laws did not correctly reflect labor-
management relations four decades later. The filibuster of that bill by the Republicans 
was the beginning of more conflicts between labor and management. The election of 
President Reagan in 1980 and his subsequent firing of the striking air traffic controllers in 
1981 was the second strike by management on labor within a short period of 3 years. 
Furthermore, growing employer opposition to unions and their organizations due to 
intense competition from in and outside the country led to firing, demoting, and 
relocating union activists, which intensified in the late 1970s. This period also 
experienced a resurgence of the Republican Party in the political scene and a polarization 
between the Senate and the executive branch in matters related to unions.  
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This dissertation is composed of three essays on US trade unions that are 
interrelated. It aims to examine fluctuations and variations in union density over time and 
across state and industry, respectively. The first and second essays explore private and 
public sector unionization, their variations, and their decline in the period mentioned 
above. The first essay is an empirical analysis of the variations and the decline of union 
density in the private sector, which experienced the worst decline during this period. The 
second essay is a qualitative comparison of two neighboring states‟ public sector 
unionization. These two states are very similar in many respects including the 
determinants of unionization; however, they experienced very different changes in their 
public sector union density in that period. The third essay studies the voting behavior of 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) cases for 
the period of 1993-2008. The NLRB is the body in charge of administering the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, which gives collective bargaining legal protection. 
Unions have long complained that the NLRB process is slow and negatively impacts a 
union organizing effort and have tried to pass bills through Congress to update the 
NLRA. Unions claim that the organizing election process adversely affects unionization 
and gives management incentive to derail the organizing drive, hence reducing union 
density.  
Previous empirical studies of union density in the private sector, which is the 
subject of the first essay, focused on the Right-To-Work laws and their effects on union 
membership rates. Studies of union density across states and over time are few and they 
differ in their choice of the determinants of unionization and their periods of study. We 
identified three studies that are closely related to the first essay; however, they employed 
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data from pre-1980. These studies and their findings are discussed in the introduction of 
the first essay. Essay two is a qualitative study and is unique in its examination of the 
public sector in two Intermountain states. Most of the public sector studies are empirical 
in nature and may not capture some specific characteristics of a state. This essay 
employed determinants of union density in the public sector from the empirical studies 
for comparison in addition to some specific issues related to these states. The third essay 
is an empirical study of voting behavior of the NLRB on ULP cases. It will expand on 
three previous studies, whose data came from pre-1980. A change in the process of 
nominations to the NLRB since 1980 inspired the third essay. The following paragraphs 
will describe in more detail the nature and the goals of all three essays. 
Essay one aims to study union density, its decline, and its variations across states 
and state-industry in the private sector. Private sector union density has been a measured 
source of the decline in unionization in the US since the early 1950s. Most of the 
literature focused on the Right-To-Work (RTW) laws and their effects on union density 
in the private as well as public sectors. Related literature to this essay utilized data from 
the 1970s and did not cover the changes that the US labor market experienced after that 
time. This essay hypothesizes that those changes in labor management relations since 
1980 have profoundly affected unionization in the US. Accordingly, it uses data from the 
1985, 1995, and 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine determinants of 
union density across state and state-industry. In addition, it introduces new variables to 
measure some of these changes that are related to employer opposition and union 
activism. The related literature has tried different proxies for these determinants and 
arrived at different conclusions. We believe our new measures are reflective of these 
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determinants of union density and expect to have significant effects on unionization in 
the private sector. We expect employer opposition to be negatively related to union 
density at state and state-industry levels. We expect that union activism significantly 
impacts union density in the private sector with a positive sign for its coefficient. 
Furthermore, this essay uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to account for 
the differences in union density over time. This method will allow us to decompose union 
density into two parts. The first part shows the impact of the characteristics (explained 
portion) on union density over time. The second part delineates the impact of the 
coefficient (unexplained portion) over time. In addition, we subdivide the decomposition 
into three parts (1985-1995, 1995-2005, and 1985-2005) to capture the effects of the 
determinants in different decades.  Finally, it uses state-industry level union density for 
the first time to enrich the number of observations and to capture the effects of the 
determinants of unionization at the state-industry levels and compare them to the state 
level observations.  
 Essay two aims to understand variations in public sector unionization; 
specifically, it compares two neighboring states, Colorado and Utah. The public and the 
private sectors are different in their industrial relations and operate under a different set 
of laws. For instance, state laws differ from interstate laws that govern private sector 
unionization. According to Freeman (1986), the public sector operates under different 
market conditions, management-employee relations, and labor force. Except for federal 
employees, state and local government employee unions operate under state collective 
bargaining laws, or lack thereof. This makes the study of public sector union density 
different in part from the private sector. In addition, state-specific characteristics can 
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greatly influence public sector unionization. Colorado and Utah have a different union 
density history in their public sectors, despite their many similarities including the 
determinants of unionization in the public sector. This chapter aims to understand 
Colorado and Utah‟s public sector union density history by looking into past events, 
which may have led to different outcomes of unionization at the end of this period. This 
includes events such as the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, the Equal Rights Act of 
the 1970s, and the resurgence of the Republican Party in the 1980s. This paper is unique 
because it is the first study of public sector unionization between Colorado and Utah. In 
addition, the time period in which this study is focused offers rich historical changes in 
public sector unionization in these two neighboring states.  
 Essay three focuses on NLRB voting behavior on ULP cases during the Clinton 
and Bush Administrations. Although it is not a direct measure of private sector union 
density, it is related to unions‟ organizing drives and employer reactions during 
organizing drives and collective bargaining in the private sector. The NLRB oversees 
unions organizing elections and responds to ULP charges. The board has been the center 
of criticism for their partiality throughout their existence. A number of issues made the 
board susceptible to these criticisms by unions and employers alike. The issues that make 
the board vulnerable to critics are the unclear language of the laws, conflicting intent by 
law makers, and interpretation problems of the NLRA by the board members. In addition, 
the laws passed by the US Congress in 1935 are outdated and do not reflect today‟s labor 
market and labor-management relations. This essay aims to understand the determinants 
of voting behavior of the board members for a period that has not been covered by other 
empirical studies. Previous empirical studies utilized data from the 1950s, 1960s, and 
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1970s and concluded that board member‟s political party affiliation and the party of the 
residing president who nominates the board members are related to voting behavior of the 
NLRB members, in addition to some economic and public accountability factors. A body 
of qualitative evidence, however, shows that some changes in the process of nomination 
and confirmation of the board members may have influenced voting behavior of the 
board after 1980. A change in the role of the US Senate from a body which until 1980 
was charged with the confirmation process, to intervention in the nomination process that 
was the sole responsibility of the president until that time, is the root cause of the changes 
in the board‟s voting behavior on ULP cases. This essay aims to study the changes in the 
voting behavior of the NLRB by incorporating new variables to capture the changes since 

























INTERSTATE AND INDUSTRY VARIATIONS IN PRIVATE 
SECTOR UNION DENSITY IN THE US 
 Introduction 
The decline in union membership in the United States (US) private sector over the 
past three decades, its causes, and consequences has attracted much attention in economic 
literature. Variations in union density at the state and industry levels and their evolution 
over time have been examined to a lesser extent, and much of the literature has focused 
on the impact of the Right-To-Work (RTW) laws on unionization. Hirsch (1980) and 
Moore and Newman (1988) examined the relationship between union density and an 
array of variables at the inter- Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) and inter-
state levels, respectively. The data for Hirsch‟s study came from the early 1970s. Moore 
and Newman used data from the 1950s to 1980s. The latest data used by studies that 
focus on the impact of the Right-To-Work laws are from 2000. 
The dramatic decline in US union density since the 1950s and the important role 
of the labor unions in society led to a series of debates among social scientists, unions, 
and businesses. According to Freeman and Medoff (1984), some economists, social 
scientists, and business managers perceive unions as harmful. This group points out that 
unions raise wages for their members at the expense of nonunion workers, hence leading 
to higher unemployment and a crowding out of the nonunion sector. Management 
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complains that unions create rigid operations and work disruption. Social critics describe 
unions as nondemocratic and socially unresponsive institutions. However, industrial 
relations experts believe that unions can increase workers‟ human capital, keep them 
informed about their work place, and pressure management to be more efficient in its 
operation. Freeman and Medoff concluded that “unionization appears to improve rather 
than to harm the social and economic system” (p. 11). The strength of unions is closely 
correlated with the level of unionization. The level of trade union membership determines 
the extent of action a trade union enjoys, the union‟s capability for financial and 
organizational survival, the ability to influence employers, and the ability to be heard by 
the general public (Riley, 1997).  What determines the level of union membership? Why 
does union density vary across space and over time? Did the same determinants of union 
density have the same impacts on membership rates in 1985 as in 2005?   
This paper revisits unionization in the private sector across states and over time 
for three years each a decade apart, 1985, 1995, and 2005. Similar to Hirsch (1980) and 
Moore and Newman (1988), it will explore the relationship between a set of region-level 
variables and union density, and similar to Moore and Newman (1988) it will utilize 
decomposition analysis to gauge individual effects of changing state-level endowments 
and returns to these attributes on union density. Its contributions to the literature are 
three-fold. First, it uses data over 1985-2005, a period during which there were major 
transformations in industrial relations, and which is not covered in the earlier studies. 
Second, it will carry out the analysis both at the state and state-industry levels. Previous 
studies did not perform the second level of analysis and therefore did not exploit rich 
variation at the industry level. Third, we introduce several new variables to capture the 
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Empirical studies of determinants of union membership are built upon the 
economic model of supply and demand for union membership (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 
1969; Hirsch, 1980; Moore and Newman, 1985; Waters et al., 1994; and Davis and 
Huston, 1995). The theory of supply and demand for union services, and determinants of 
each, are discussed in more detail under the Theoretical Framework section later in this 
chapter.   
Among studies of the determinants of union density, Hirsch (1980), Moore and 
Newman (1988), and Hogler et al. (2004) are of the greatest interest for our purposes 
because they share three commonalities with the present essay. First, each uses aggregate 
regional-level data as the unit of observation. Second, each uses similar estimation 
methodologies. Third, they use similar specifications in exploring the determinants of 
unionization. 
Hirsch (1980) estimated union density at the SMSA level using the 1973-75 
Current Population Survey data. He modeled demand for union membership as a function 
of income level, tastes or preferences, and relative attractiveness of the price of 
alternatives. The supply of unionization, in turn, depended on organizing costs and the 
costs of providing union services. On the demand side, specific variables were earnings 
level, and labor force characteristics that included occupation, gender, race, age, and 
labor force composition. The average earnings level is expected to be positively related to 
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demand for unionization, on the presumption that union services are a normal good.
1
 In 
addition to earnings level, Hirsh also considered adding union wage gap as a variable that 
would directly affect union density, but omitted it due to lack of data. Among the labor-
force characteristics, the proportion of white-collar workers in the labor force is expected 
to be negatively related to union density because white-collar workers are less likely to be 
unionized. Similarly, the share of female workers is hypothesized to be negatively related 
to union density. The impact of  non-White workers on unionization is ambiguous due to 
two opposing factors, hence no sign was assigned for this variable. Average age is 
another determinant of union density, but the net results for this variable on unionization 
may be negligible due to union rules and the benefits of unionization. On the supply side, 
specific variables that affect the costs of organizing and providing union services are 
employers and employees‟ attitudes, industrial structure, and composition of the labor 
force. Hirsch used nine census regions to capture employers and workers attitudes, as 
well as regional differences in the labor-force and industry characteristics. For example, 
southern states were perceived to be hostile towards unions resulting in higher organizing 
costs and industries (measured by share of employment) that operate in concentrated 
markets are believed to be less costly to organize. The share of women in the labor force 
is expected to be negatively related to union density because women are more costly to 
organize. Finally, RTW states, which prohibit union security clauses, are expected to 
have less union membership due to the increase in costs to supply union services. 
Hirsch used these supply and demand functions to derive a reduced form equation 
for union density and utilized both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 2 Stage Least 
                                                          
1
 One well-known problem related to the relationship between the two variables is the simultaneity problem 
since a higher rate of unionization may also result in higher earnings due to collective bargaining, Hirsch 
and other scholars determine unionization and earnings simultaneously. 
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Squares (2SLS) (in view of the simultaneity problem between union density and 
earnings) techniques to estimate the impact of explanatory variables on union density. 
His OLS regressions contained three separate estimations. One regression includes all 
independent variables. Another excludes all industries and the third regression estimates 
industries only. He found that unionization increases as earning levels increase. The share 
of white-collar workers negatively affected union density. RTW laws reduce union 
density; however, they do not affect union coverage rates. Industry effects varied with 
model specification and often were not in line with the author‟s expectations. Hirsch‟s 
explanation for these unexpected results is as follows. He stated that it is possible that the 
interindustry variations are due to personal characteristics, regions, occupations, and 
earnings rather than differences from market structure and capital intensity. However, he 
called for a further study in the relationship between industry and unionization. Race, sex, 
and regional differences had a lesser impact on interarea variations in union density. 
Although Hirsch‟s study provides valuable information on unionization across 
metropolitan areas, the information is limited to a point in time and does not capture 
whether the observed relationships change over time.   
Similarly, Moore and Newman (1988) used a reduced form equation to estimate 
union density at the state level, but they carried out estimations at different points in time 
to account for the evolution of the estimated effects over time. Their analysis attempts to 
distinguish between four sets of factors that relate to the hypotheses proposed to explain 
union density decline: structure and composition of the labor force, management 
opposition, changes in public policy, and union organizing activity. Variations in the 
structure and composition of the labor force factors are measured in terms of gender, 
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race, age, region, industry, occupation, and urbanization. The percentage of the 
population living in an urban area was expected to have a positive effect on union 
membership. Instead of Hirsch‟s nine census regions as a measure of employer and 
employee attitudes towards unions, Moore and Newman used the south region as a proxy 
for taste, which was expected to have a negative impact on unionization due to hostile 
southern attitudes towards unions. They also measured industry in a different setting than 
Hirsch‟s study, whereby they aggregated goods-producing industries -- mining, 
construction, manufacturing, and transportation. This variable is expected to impact 
union membership positively due to these industry‟s history of high rates of unionization. 
The management opposition hypothesis implies that management opposition towards 
unions will result in lower union membership. This is operationalized  in terms of the 
reported number of unfair labor practice (ULP) cases by management, relative to the 
number of eligible voters in the representation election in each state. This proxy is a more 
direct measurement of employer opposition to unionization and differs from Hirsch‟s 
overall attitudes (employers and employees). Management opposition would raise the 
costs of organizing and reduce the demand for union services; therefore, a negative sign 
was expected. Changes in public policy include RTW laws and the government 
subsitution of union services hypothesis (welfare expenditure and unemployment 
compensation). RTW laws can impact unionization negatively by raising the costs of 
organizing due to free rider problems and reducing the demand for union membership by 
weakening a union‟s bargaining power. Government social welfare programs such as 
welfare expenditure and unemployment compensation were also expected to have a 
negative impact on unionization to the extent that such services were normally provided 
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by unions. Finally, the authors also considered the impact of union organizing activities 
as a determinant of unionization, but did not develop any proxy to measure this effect and 
left it outside their analysis.  
Moore and Newman utilized the OLS regression model to estimate unionization 
at the state level for 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980. They also ran a pooled regression to 
capture the 1950-1980 over time average impact. Finally, they employed Farber and 
Blinder decomposition methods to account for the individual effects of endowments and 
estimated the coefficients of explanatory variables on union density between 1950 and 
1980. They found that most of the postwar decline in union density was due to structural 
shifts in employment patterns. Negative contributors to the decline in unionization over 
the 30 year period were increases in women and young people‟s shares in the labor force, 
and the decline in blue-collar jobs. Offsetting these negative elements over the same 
period was an increase in firm size and urbanization of the population. With respect to 
public policy, they found RTW laws had a negative impact on the extent of unionization. 
They treated RTW as an exogenous variable and they cautioned that their results for this 
variable might overstate the impact of RTW laws due to bidirectional relationships 
between union density and RTW laws. They did not find any support for government 
substitution hypothesis with the exception of unemployment compensation. Employer 
opposition measured by unfair labor practices had no significant effect on unionization in 
their study. Their study was a step forward in comparison with a single period cross-
sectional study because it introduced the time element in the model. However, their study 
periods ended in 1980, which does not capture the changes in the labor market during the 
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past three decades. There are also problems with their decomposition methodology, 
which we will address later in the empirical section of this essay.   
Hogler et al. (2004) studied determinants of unionization in the lower 48 states 
with an emphasis on state labor policy. They added two variables to the determinants of 
union density, which were not included in the previous two studies we examined in this 
paper.  Five factors are believed to influence the levels of union density at the state level. 
Employer opposition, legal environment (RTW laws), and labor market and worker‟s 
characteristics were among the determinants that we mentioned above. The social context 
of union organizing and political ideology in the state are the new additions. The social 
context of union organizing is a variable that measures union activism, which was 
mentioned in Moore and Newman but was not included in their empirical model due to a 
lack of data. Hogler et al. included an index of 14 variables that measured the social 
context of union activism. The index includes factors such as attendance at town or 
school board meetings and voting behavior in presidential elections. It was assumed that 
a higher level of the electorates showing up for presidential elections was correlated with 
higher union activities and was expected to be positively related to union density. 
Political ideology measures the attitude of the population towards unions. It was 
measured by votes for Democrats in the 2000 presidential elections in a state and was 
expected to be a positive sign. They ran several regressions using OLS and 2SLS. In their 
final model, the authors found that union density across states was negatively affected by 
employer opposition, RTW laws, and one of the 14 variables from the capital index 
(meeting), and positively affected by political ideology (vote for Democrats), and the 
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percentage of the electorate who voted in presidential elections in 1988 and 1992. Their 
final model explains 78 percent of the variations in union density across states. 
Studies of determination of union density vary in their choice of units of 
observations and specification. Some studies focused on the effects of RTW laws on the 
extent of union density (Elwood and Fine, 1978; Moore and Newman, 1985; Davis and 
Huston, 1995). For example, Elwood and Fine used the state level as their unit of 
observation, whereas Davis and Huston used individuals as their unit of observation. 
Both studies focused on the effect of RTW laws on union density and both found that 
RTW laws have negative effects on union density. Freeman and Kleiner (1990) focused 
on employer oppositions to union organizing drives at the firm level by using surveys in 
two different states in 1986. They found management opposition was an important 
determinant of the union decline. Bronfenbrenner (1997) focused on how unions can 
improve their organizing efforts and increase their union membership rate. She stated that 
a union‟s strategy has an important impact on the outcome of organizing drives. 
Although studies on unionization vary in their choice of units of observations 
(individual, state, firm) and their focus with respect to specific determinants (RTW laws, 
employer opposition, union activism) of union density, they all employ many of the 
variables that we mentioned above. Management opposition to organized labor and 
organizing activities by the unions are part of our focus in this paper. Many studies agree 
that employer opposition towards unions is a major factor in union decline (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984: Kleiner, 1990). Freeman and Medoff emphasized that employer 
opposition to unionization was the greatest obstacle to unionization efforts and an 
individual‟s decision to join unions. Kate Bronfenbrenner studied union organizing 
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strategies in the private and public sectors and concluded that a union‟s strategies play a 
big role in elections outcomes. According to Fiorito et al. (1995), unions are not helpless 
victims of their environments and can help to determine their own fates. However, 
measurement of employer and union behavior and estimating their effects on union 
density are fraught with difficulties because there are no easily observable and commonly 
agreed upon metrics in terms of which employers and union actions can be assessed. 
Moore and Newman (1988) did not include union organizing activites, because they did 
not developed any proxy for it. Hogler et al. (2004) used a social capital index as proxy 
for union activities, which included 14 components of social activities in a state. Hirsch 
(1980) used census regions to capture, among other things, the employer‟s attitude 
towards unions. Moore and Newman (1988) and Hogler et al. (2004) used unfair labor 
practice cases to measure employer opposition; however, the first study divided this 
number by eligible voters and the second divided the number of election petitions by 
unfair labor practice cases. Interpretations of these variables are ambiguous; although 
related to the intended variables they measure different effects. In the case of 
management opposition, Hogler et al. (2004) deflate numbers of election petitions by 
number of ULP cases and Moore and Newman (1988) deflate the number of ULP cases 
by the number of eligible voters.  
Another issue that is not sufficiently addressed in the literature, except for Moore 
and Newman (1988), is that each period may be unique and some determinants may have 
different impacts on unionization in one period more than another period due to the 
dynamic nature of the labor force structure and characteristics. In this paper, we 
contribute to the literature first by developing new measures of employer opposition and 
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union activism, and estimate their effect on union density, and second by applying the 
empirical model across three more recent periods, each a decade apart, so that we do not 
only update the existing studies but also capture changes over time.  
 
Variations in Union Density by State and Industry: 1985-2005 
Private sector unionization rates in the 1950s reached their highest level of 35 
percent, before starting a steady decline. Up until the late 1970s, union membership had 
experienced a relative decline with respect to the labor force; however, this had changed 
into an absolute decline since the beginning of the 1980s. The magnitude of the decline 
varied among the states. Some states on average experienced a higher percentage decline 
than others. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for private sector union density by states for 
1985, 1995, and 2005. These three years were chosen for the following reasons. First, the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Extracts that provide information on 
union membership are available since 1983. Definitions of some of the explanatory 
variables in our model, such as employer opposition and union activism, require lags up 
to 3 years; therefore, we started with 1985. Second, the 10-year intervals allow us to 
examine the changes in union density and their determinants over time. Third, existing 
studies used older data and our data are more recent and up-to-date. Table 1 shows that 
the average union density across states declined 46 percent between 1985 and 2005 from 
13.18 to 7.08 percent. However, this decline was not even across all states. Union density 
declined on average 55 percent in states with lower than average unionization and 43 
percent in states with higher than average unionization.     
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Table 1 tells only part of the story. Changing distribution of union membership 
can be observed across states and over time in the kernel function (Figures 1 and 2). 
Union density has transformed from a bimodal distribution in 1985 to an increasingly 
skewed distribution over the years. This distribution became increasingly asymmetric 
with a measured skewness of 0.18 in 1985, 0.37 in 1995, and 0.68 in 2005. This 
information suggests that across-state distribution of union density in the private sector in 
1985 consisted of two bifurcated distinct groups, one with higher union density and the 
other with lower union density. Over the years, however, this distribution changed, not 
only with the across-the-board decline in union density but also with the migration of 
highly unionized states to the other end of the spectrum. Meanwhile, low density states 
moved further to even lower unionization. 
Box and whisker plots display this set of data on union density at the state and 
state-industry levels in a different way (Figures 3 and 4). Figure 3 shows that in 1985, 
union density was evenly distributed between 4 percent and 24 percent. The box 
represents half of the states and the whiskers the other half. Half of the state‟s union 
density (box) in 1985 ranged between 8.5 and 18.5 percent. However, the numbers for 
2005 were between 4 and 10. This statistic indicates the range between lower and upper 
median shrank and dropped over these years.  
The same phenomenon took place at the state-industry levels, as shown in Figures 
3 and 4. State-industry level union density has experienced a similar pattern of 
distribution over the same periods (Figure 3). Although industries with low union density 
were more concentrated and industries with high unionization more dispersed in 1985, 
they show similar movements towards low density unionization, as was the case for state-
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level unionization. By 2005, industries with low union density constituted of a majority 
of industries, and highly unionized industries became very few. One distinction between 
state-level unionization and state-industry is the upper whiskers in Figure 4. This 
distinction means six out of eight industries at the bottom were more closely unionized 
than the top two. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 The theoretical model underlying all previous studies assumes that union density 
is determined by the interaction of supply and demand for union services, and the density 
changes with factors that affect the supply and demand relationship. Union membership 
is assumed to be an asset that brings a flow of services to utility maximizing individuals 
(Hirsch, 1980). The demand for union services depends negatively on the price of these 
services and positively on the income (wealth) of the individuals, assuming union 
services are normal goods. The supply of union services depends directly on the price and 
inversely on the cost of providing such services. Since the price of union services is not 
observable, empirical studies estimate a reduced form of supply and demand, which 
eliminates the price of union services. Thus, union density is estimated as a function of a 
set of variables that are expected to determine the location of supply and demand for 
union services. Therefore, empirical analysis proceeds by deriving a reduced form 
equation for the “quantity of unionization” as a function of demand and supply shift 
factors. One difficulty encountered in this approach is that many of the determinants of 
supply and demand for union services are not directly observable or quantifiable and are 
therefore measured by proxy. Therefore, empirical analysis proceeds by deriving a 
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reduced form equation for the “quantity of unionization” as a function of demand and 
supply shift factors. 
 We include in our analysis the following variables, many of which are standard in 
the related literature, although some of them are included explicitly in the analysis for the 
first time in our paper. We first consider income factors, followed by labor force 
characteristics, attitudinal variables, industry mix, RTW laws, management resistance, 
and union activism. 
 
Income factors 
Earning. Wealth and permanent income are assumed to increase the demand for 
union membership, because union membership is assumed to be a normal good (Hirsch, 
1980). However, higher earnings not only increase the desire for union membership, but 
higher earnings are also achieved by being a union member. Therefore, a bidirectional 
relationship exists between earnings and unionization, which may create a simultaneity 
problem. Economists treat earnings as an endogenous variable in their models as 
determinants of union density. However, simultaneity may be less problematic at the state 
level, because unions are less likely to raise the level of income for labor as a whole 
(Hirsch, 1980). Since earnings raise the level of unionization, a positive sign for this 
variable is expected.  
Union wage-gap. Unions achieve higher wages for their members compared to 
nonmembers. The wage differential between union and nonunion workers is estimated 
around 15 percent on average for all industries. However, the gap varies substantially 
among different industries. We added union-nonunion wage gap to our model, because 
we expect workers to take advantage of higher wages achieved through union 
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membership. However, there is a tradeoff between wages and employment in the private 
sector. Higher wages also lead to lower employment, hence lower unionization. The net 
effect of this variable on the extent of unionization is not predicted. This variable was 
missing in Hirsch‟s study due to lack of data.  
 
Labor force characteristics  
Blue-collar. Manual workers are more likely to unionize especially in those 
industries in which a clear distinction between blue and white-collar workers exists. 
Blue-collar workers do not identify themselves as being related to management, they are 
less likely to have bargaining power individually, and they will achieve higher wages 
through unionization. An increase in the share of the blue-collar workers in the labor 
force is expected to increase union density.   
Gender. Women are less likely to join unions, because they are less attached to 
the workforce and they usually work in nontraditional union occupations, such as service 
sectors. Therefore, the share of women in the workforce is assumed to negatively relate to 
union membership rate. 
Race. Discrimination in organizing non-White workers may prevent them from 
joining a union; however, minorities assume to benefit the most from unionization 
(Hirsch, 1980). Previous studies produced different signs for this variable due to these 
two opposing forces; therefore, the outcome of the impact of this variable is 
indeterminate.  
 
Public attitudes  
In this paper, we include urbanization rate and four census regions to capture 
public attitudes towards unions.  
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Urbanization rate. Union density is expected to be higher in densely populated 
areas, because more urbanized areas facilitate union recruitment operations (Riley, 1997). 
It also captures the taste for unionization. Urban environments are more favorable to 
collective action in comparison to rural environments, because in the latter, residents are 
more likely to be hostile towards unions (Moore and Newman, 1988). Therefore, states 
with higher urban population share are expected to have more union membership; hence, 
we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable.  
Region. The US Census Bureau recognizes four census regions. Economists 
frequently use regions as one of many determinants of union membership. Regions 
capture attitudes of the employees and employers towards unions, labor force 
characteristics, and industrial structure of a particular region (Hirsch, 1980). In this paper, 
we use four census regions (South, West, Northeast, and Midwest).  
 
Industry 
Industry mix in this paper is used in two different settings. At the state level, we 
capture union density variations due to industry mix first by distinguishing commodity-
producing industries from other industries. We also include a variable to measure the 
impact of firm size. At the state-industry level analysis, we are able to capture variations 
in unionization across industries using industry-fixed effects.   
Industry structure. Most of the studies that use individual level data tend to 
examine industry specific characteristics such as labor and capital intensity and product 
market concentration (Hirsch and Berger, 1984; and Riley, 1997).  Studies of union 
membership at the state or metropolitan level also include industry controls. Previous 
studies show that unionization is higher in industries with high risk to injury and illness. 
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Highly unionized industries are more capital intensive, operate in regulated or 
oligopolistic product markets, have more blue-collar workers, and involve dangerous or 
unpleasant working conditions (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2006). It is expected that 
unionization is higher in mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, 
communications, and utilities, and lower in sales and service sectors. 
Commodity production. The concentration of union density among a few 
industries in the US has been associated with heavy goods producing industries (Moore 
and Newman, 1988). Industries such as mining, construction, and manufacturing are 
among the most heavily unionized in comparison to other industries such as service and 
retail industries in the private sector. The underlying reasons for higher unionization 
among these sectors of the economy are lower organizing costs due to working 
environment and concentration of workers. A higher share of employment of these 
industries in a state should positively affect unionization. 
Firm size. Large firms are less costly to organize and provide union services 
because of the economies of scale (Moore and Newman, 1988). Furthermore, workers in 
large plants are likely to be treated impersonally and union membership may offer 
protection and decreasing alienation (Riley, 1997). It is not clear what defines a small, 
medium, or large firm, because the definition depends on the industry considered. For 
example, the US Small Business Administration defines firms with less than 500 
employees in manufacturing and mining as small; however, it considers firms with 100 
employees or less in wholesale trade small. The European Union defines any firm with 
more than 250 employees as a large firm.  The US Census does not define firm size and it 
reports firms by number of employees. A general consensus points to firms with 100 
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employees or less as a small firm, between 100 and 500 employees as medium size, and 
500 plus as a large firm for the US and Canada. We define firms with more than 500 
employees as large firms and we expect the share of employment in the large firms to be 
positively related to unionization in our model. 
 
Right-To-Work law  
Union density in the private sector on average was less than half in states
2
 with 
RTW laws compared to non-RTW states in 2008 (4.3 percent versus 9.01 percent). States 
with RTW laws allow employees, if they choose to do so, not to pay union dues or 
become union members in a unionized firm. This policy means unions are not allowed to 
bargain on union security clauses. Union security clauses requires employees to become 
union members as a condition of their employment. It is generally accepted that RTW 
laws promote the free rider problem and reduce union membership (Ichniowski and Zax, 
1991; Moore, 1998). RTW states do not require employees covered by collective 
bargaining to pay any dues even when they receive benefits negotiated by unions. There 
are currently 22 states that have adopted such laws. Since RTW laws promote free 
ridership and reduce unionization, we expect to have a negative sign for this variable.  
 
Management opposition 
Freeman (1988) reports that  a Conference Board survey shows 45 percent of 
firms had “operating union free” as a labor policy goal in their Personal Practices Forum 
in 1983, versus 31 percent in 1977, which is an indication of a substantial increase in 
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management opposition towards unionizations. In another study, Kleiner (2001) states 
that 40 percent of the union density decline in the private sector was due to management 
opposition. Empirical studies made use of the number measures based on unfair labor 
practices (ULP) as proxies for management opposition. ULP cases are charges against 
employers by employees and unions through the National Labor Relation Board (NLRB). 
Moore and Newman (1988) used the 3-years-average number of ULP cases divided by 
the number of eligible voters in the representative elections as their proxy for employer 
opposition. The division of ULP cases against employers by number of eligible voters in 
the Moore and Newman study is flawed, because a large number of voters in a single 
firm can dwarf this ratio; hence, it is not a representative of management opposition. 
Hogler et al. (2004) used an index, which is the average ratio of number of election 
petitions filed to number of ULP cases between 1980 and 1990, in analyzing union 
density variations in 2000. Dividing the number of election petitions by the number of 
ULP cases against employers in the Hogler study can also be misleading. In the case that 
unions try to organize a few big firms in comparison to many small firms, the ratio will 
fluctuate sharply.  
In order to capture management opposition towards unions, this paper uses ULP 
cases in a different setting. We believe that it is more reflective of an employer‟s 
opposition towards unionization in a state to divide the number of ULP cases against 
employers by the total ULP cases in a state. Total ULP cases include charges against 
employers by employees and unions, against unions by employees and employers, and 
against unions by unions. ULP cases against employers are cases that are filed by unions 
and employees for varying reasons. ULP cases can occur during a union‟s organizing 
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drive for new member recruitment, during a union strike, and over collective bargaining 
contracts. ULP cases against unions are filed by employees, employers, and other unions 
for illegal restraint of employees, secondary boycotts, and jurisdiction disputes. For 
instance, 24,720 ULP cases were filed in 2005 in which 18,304 cases were against 
employers, 6,381 cases against unions, and a small number of cases were related to the 
hot-cargo agreement.
3
 Most of the ULP charges against employers were due to refusal to 
bargain, which accounted for 8,911 cases. The second largest ULP charges against 
employers were alleged illegal discharges or other forms of discrimination against 
employees, which amounted to 8,047 cases. These two categories of charges against 
employers constitute 68 percent of all ULP cases in 2005. The majority of ULP cases 
against unions were charges of alleged illegal restraint and coercion of employees. Out of 
6,381 cases filed against unions, 5,405 cases were due to illegal restraint and coercion of 
employees, 594 cases of illegal discrimination against employees, and 493 allegations of 
illegal secondary boycotts and jurisdiction dispute. Seventy five percent of the total 
charges against employers were filed by unions and 25 percent by individuals. Our 
numerator measures the level to which employers commit ULPs against labor in a state. 
Our denominator is the total ULP cases filed through the NLRB in a state. By dividing all 
ULP cases against employers by the total ULP cases, we will measure the percent of ULP 
charges in a state that are due to management opposing labor. Some ULP cases have a 
shorter life span than others; some are filed in one year and resolved in another year due 
to NLRB case loads and the complexity of the cases. ULP cases may also differ from one 
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year to another due to contract cycles, economics factors, and union activities. In order to 
overcome these delays and volatilities we take 3-years-averages of ULP cases against 
employers prior to the observation year and divide it by the averages of total ULP cases. 
We expect this variable to be negatively related to union density. 
Union decertification. One of the management‟s complaints about unions has 
been wage differentials between union and nonunion firms. Freeman (2005) states higher 
wages achieved by unions are the leading cause of management opposition in the U.S. 
labor market. Unionized workers earned on average 18 percent higher wages than 
nonunion workers in 1989-1990 and 1994-1995 (Hirsch and Schumacher 1998). In some 
industries such as construction, the union wage gap could be as high as 50 percent. 
Managers in the unionized firms have been trying to get rid of unions by actively 
engaging in union decertification. These activities are different from those unfair labor 
practices committed by management during an organizing drive to unionize a new firm, 
which is captured by the management opposition variable. Management opposition to 
existing unions shows the last stage of management-union conflict over collective 
bargaining in which management initiates the action against unions. In the first stage, 
unions set a process in motion and management tries to stop it and in the latter, 
management tries to undo what unions have achieved through their lengthy efforts. 
However, not all employers try to get rid of unions in all states. The level of management 
aggressiveness differs in different states and in different firms due to market conditions 
and state-specific characteristics. Some markets might be more competitive than others 
and some states might be less hostile towards unionization. The variable “decertification” 
measures management‟s aggressiveness to decertify unions from their firms. To capture 
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management aggressiveness in decertification of existing unions, we calculated the ratio 
of the number of eligible voters in NLRB decertification elections to the number of union 
members in that state. Furthermore, we smooth out this ratio by taking an averages for 3 
years prior to the observation year. We hypothesize that this proxy should have a 
negative effect on the extent of unionization.  
 
Union activism  
While collective bargaining in many countries takes place at the industry or 
national level, in the United States, it takes place at the firm level and coordination at the 
national level is absent (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). This gives local unions more 
power and independence from national organizations. Freeman (1988) pointed out three 
hypotheses with respect to union performance and declining union membership rate in 
the private sector. The first hypothesis states that unions may have poorly represented 
their members; hence, this led to their membership decline. However, Freeman (1988) 
dismisses this claim based on unions‟ higher wage and benefits achievement for their 
members and polls showing member‟s satisfaction with their unions. The second 
hypothesis raises the issue of unions‟ failure to allocate enough resources to recruit new 
members and boost their membership. Freeman (1988) found support for this claim that 
unions did not allocate enough resources to recruit new members. However, union 
financial support for new recruitment has improved since 1995 (Yates, 2009). The third 
hypothesis is related to management opposition towards collective bargaining, which we 
mentioned above under management opposition. Hirsch (1980) did not consider union 
performance. Moore and Newman (1988) considered union performance but did not 
include any proxy to capture union activities. Hogler et al. (2004) considered and used an 
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index of social capital containing 14 social factors to measure union activities. However, 
Hogler‟s social capital index did not produce any statistically significant result. The result 
for the social index was negatively related to union density; however, it was not 
statistically significant. Hogler et al., then, ran regressions using their three main 
independent variables with each individual component of the social capital index. Their 
final model included two of the 14 social capital index components, which were 
statistically significant. Running such regression iteration in search of a proxy for union 
activism did not convince us to consider the same proxies for our model. A widely 
accepted proxy for union activism is not readily available. Unions actively organize new 
members through NLRB and outside NLRB through Card Check. Although, union 
activities through NLRB are reported in the NLRB‟s annual reports, data for card check 
activities are not widely available. This limited information on union activities does not 
reflect all union efforts, but under the circumstances, it is a reliable proxy for our 
purpose. Union activities are also influenced by their environment such as management 
opposition, labor laws, and public attitudes, which are controlled for in our models. We 
developed our own proxy for union activism through the NLRB for each state using the 
number of eligible voters in collective bargaining elections as reported by the NLRB 
annual reports divided by the number of nonunion workers in a state. The number of 
eligible voters in collective bargaining elections shows the levels of union activities in 
organizing new firms in a state. Organizing new entities and hence new members is 
costly and depends on state laws, employer opposition, firm size, and a union‟s strategy. 
A union‟s goals are to increase its memberships and enhance its members‟ benefits at 
minimum cost. Larger nonunion firms offer greater opportunity and payoff to unions than 
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smaller firms, and cost less to unionize and to provide union services. We use the number 
of the eligible voters in collective bargaining elections as our numerator and the number 
of nonunion workers as our denominator. The numerator shows the number of workers 
that unions target to organize. In order for a union to have a collective bargaining election 
in the targeted firm, they have to convince a minimum of 30 percent of the eligible 
workers in that firm to sign a petition showing their desire to be represented by a union. 
This petition then is submitted to the NLRB for the election process. The NLRB will then 
conduct a secret ballet vote after it verifies the authenticity of the petition. The 
denominator is the number of the workers in the private sector in a state that are not 
unionized. The size of the private sector labor force in each state differs and dividing the 
number of the eligible voters in collective bargaining elections by the number of 
nonunionized workers will reflect the level of union‟s activities in each state. This ratio 
will capture a union‟s organizing activities through the NLRB in a state. Elections take 
time to run their course and differ in their frequencies year to year. Some elections take 
longer to conduct due to NLRB workloads or employer‟s resistance. In some years, the 
number of elections is higher due to faster process by the NLRB, a union‟s activities, and 
less opposition by employers than other years. In order to smooth out the volatility in 
elections in a particular year, we take the averages of 3 years prior to the observation 
year. We expect union activism to be positively related to union density.  
 
Empirical Methodology 
The empirical model we use in the state level regression is: 
ssss eXD  )1(  
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D stands for union density, α is the intercept, X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a 
vector of coefficients, e is the error term, and s is the state subscript. Vector X includes 
median earning level in the state, union-nonunion wage gap, share of blue-collar workers 
in the labor force, female share, minority share, urbanization rate, region, share of 




At the state-industry level, the empirical model is: 
siisssisisi eIXWD  )2(  
where D is the union density at state-industry, W is a vector of variables measured at the 
state-industry level, X is a vector of explanatory variables measured at the state level, β 
and δ are vectors of coefficients, and I is industry-fixed effects. Subscripts s and i denote 
state and industry, respectively. Vector W includes median earning level, the union wage 
gap, blue-collar, female share, and minority share. Vector X includes urbanization rate, 
region, firm size, RTW, employer opposition, union decertification, and union activism.  
We will estimate equations (1) and (2) first by OLS for each year 1985, 1995, and 
2005, as well as the pooled sample over the 3 years. One econometric problem that 
plagues this literature is the simultaneity problem. The problem emerges first in relation 
to the earnings and union density. Since unions raise wages, it could be argued that the 
causality runs in both directions between median state earnings and union density. We 
solved the problem of simultaneity for earnings by using an instrumental variable for 
earnings. Following Hirsch (1980) we used education, age, marital status, and male labor-
force participation as instruments for earnings. Secondly, studies which focus on RTW 
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laws as possible determinants of union density treat this variable as an endogenous 
variable, on the grounds that states with high union density are less likely to pass such 
laws (Hirsch, 1980; Koeller, 1985; Davis and Huston, 1995). Therefore, the causality 
may run from union density to RTW laws. We treat this variable as an exogenous 
variable for the following two reasons. First, these laws were for most states adopted in 
the past
4
 and an individual‟s decision to join a union today is not associated with the 
passage of such laws (Ichniowski and Zax, 1991). Second, most recent literature agrees 
on the negative impact of RTW laws on union density due to free rider problems 
(Ichniowski and Zax, 1991; Moore, 1998).  
Our analysis of union density continues by employing the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition does not 
appear much in the union density literature; however, it is frequently used in gender and 
minority wage gap literature. This technique allows us to separate the changes in average 
union density over time into two parts. Part one (explained) of the decomposition tells us 
the changes in unionization due to the differences in the average level of characteristics 
weighted by a base year coefficient. Part two (unexplained) of the decomposition gives us 
the differences in the slope coefficients between the base year and comparison year 
weighted by average level of characteristics in the comparison year. Equation (3) shows 
the decomposition of the change in average union density ( D ) in 1985 and 2005 into part 
one and part two, where the bar represents average value of characteristics and βs 
represent slope coefficient estimates. Superscript denotes the years. 
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 Most states adopted RTW laws in the 1940s and 1950s, however three states adopted such laws in our 
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The first expression on the right is the explained portion (the gap due to 
endowment) and the second expression on the right is the unexplained portion (the gap 
due to returns to observed characteristics and intercept). The decomposition method, 
however, poses two identification problems. The first identification problem (the index 
problem) arises from the sensitivity to the choice of the base year. The question is 
whether we should take 1985 or 2005 as the base year. A third option which we will 
adopt in the paper is to use the average of 1985 and 2005 as the base. The second 
identification problem arises from the use of categorical variables when using detailed 
Oaxaca decomposition of year differential. According to Yun (2005), the detailed 
coefficient effects (unexplained portion of the decomposition) of the categorical variables 
are not invariant to the choice of the reference group. Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) 
showed, however, the overall decomposition and the endowment effects are invariant to 
the base group. Moore and Newman (1988) neglect the second identification problem. 
We incorporate the bases in all categorical variables in our analysis to overcome the issue 




The dependent variable is the percent of nonagricultural wage and salary workers 
in the private sector who are union members. This variable is derived from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and is accessed at http://www.ceprdata.org/cps/org_data.php.  
 The explanatory variables, which are reported in Table 2 and 3, are defined as 
follows. Earnings are measured as median weekly weighted average of male and female 
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workers. Wage gap is measured as percent difference in the hourly wage between union 
and nonunion workers. Blue-collar workers are the percent of the labor force who work 
as manual operatives. Female share is the percentage of women in the labor force. 
Minority share is the percentage of non-White workers in the labor force. We used 
percentage of population living in metropolitan areas as defined by the CPS as our 
urbanization rate. We lagged this variable by 5 years and used 1980, 1990 and 2000 
Census data for 1985, 1995, and 2005 analysis, since the Census Bureau conducts its 
more accurate surveys every 10 years. Earning, wage gap, share of blue-collar, female 
share, minority share, and urbanization rate are derived from the CPS. Regional dummies 
are four main census regions from the CPS. Commodity share represents the percentage 
of workers who are employed in goods producing industries (mining, construction, and 
manufacturing) and is derived from the CPS. Firm size is the percent of the labor force 
working in firms with more than 500 employees and is derived from 
http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds /bds_database_list. RTW states
5
 are those 
states that adopted RTW laws prior to the observation years. A dummy variable is 
assigned for this variable and equals one if the state is a RTW state and zero otherwise.  
Employer opposition is measured by the number of ULP charges against employers in the 
representation elections divided by total ULP charges. This ratio is derived from the 
NLRB annual reports at (http://www.nlrb.gov /annual-reports). Union decertification is 
the number of eligible voters in the decertification elections divided by the number of 
union members in the private sector and is derived from the NLRB annual reports. 
                                                          
5
 RTW states are as follows: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 




Activism is measured by dividing the number of eligible voters in the collective 
bargaining elections by the number of nonunion workers in the private sector. This ratio 
is also derived from the NLRB annual reports.   
Industry 8 is wholesale trade and is the reference industry. The remaining 
industries are as follows: Construction 1; Mining 2; Durable Manufacturing 3; 
Nondurable Manufacturing 4; Retail Sales 5; Service (finance, insurance, and real estate) 
6; and Transportation, Communication, and Utilities 7. 
 
Results 
Results from OLS regressions of equation (1) are reported in Table 4. These 
results indicate that our model explains between 75 and 87 percent of the variations in 
union density between 1985 and 2005. Table 5 reports the results for 2SLS regressions in 
which we used an instrumental variable for earnings.
6
 Estimates for these two models are 
similar and do not suggest that simultaneity is a serious problem.  
Our results show that earning is a positive determinant of unionization at the .10 
level in our pooled model and at the .01 level in 2005. Unionization in 1995 was not 
impacted by the level of earnings; however, it was negatively impacted in 1985. The 
pooled model result meets our expectations and is consistent with the prediction based on 
unionization being a normal good. An increase in the level of income leads to a greater 
demand for union membership, everything else being constant.  
                                                          
6
 Instrumental variable for earnings includes all explanatory variables plus a vector of new variables 
(workers with less than high school diploma, workers between 16 and 24 years of age and 55 years and 
older, workers who are married).  
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Wage-gap between union and nonunion workers has no significant impact on 
union density in our models. The effect of wage gap might have been captured by other 
variables such as industry and regions (Hirsch, 1980).  
The results for the labor force structure and personal characteristics are mixed. 
Share of blue-collar workers in the labor force had a positive and significant effect on 
unionization in 2005 and the entire period. This confirms our expectations that blue-
collar workers are more likely to join unions than white-collar employees. Hirsch (1980) 
and Moore and Newman (1998) found similar findings. Blue-collar workers are the 
backbone of the unions in the private sector; however, their share relative to total 
employment is decreasing. Percentage share of total employment for the blue-collar 
workers has dropped from 39.1 to 23.4 during the period of 1950-2003 in the US 
(Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2006). This has had an impact on private sector unionization 
and the market outcome in the US.     
Overall, female share had no significant impact on union density between 1985 
and 2005. However, it had a positive and significant impact in 2005. Its overall impact on 
unionization has been negative between 1985 and 2005, however not significant. Our 
results for this variable differ from the results reported by Moore and Newman, however 
consistent with Hirsch‟s study. These results mask the rise in female union membership 
as a whole. Thirty four percent of all union members in 1983 were women in the US and 
this figure increased to 43 percent in 2004 (Milkman, 2007). However, most of this 
increase was in the public sector. According to Milkman (2007), 60.8 percent of all 
unionized women were employed in the public sector compare to 36.7 percent unionized 
men in 2004. In the private sector, this figure is much lower (5.4 and 10.1 percent for 
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women and men, respectively). This statistic means female workers are as likely to 
unionize as male workers; however, unlike their male counterparts, they are concentrated 
in fewer occupations.  
Minority share in the labor force has no significant effect on unionization in any 
period of our study.
7
 Hirsch found similar results for this variable.  
Urbanization rate has no significant impact on the extent of unionization in our 
models. The sign of the coefficient for this variable, however, is positive, which was 
expected and is consistent with the literature that urban areas are more likely to be 
unionized. This variable had a significant impact on union density in Moore and 
Newman‟s pooled model. This difference between our results and theirs may lie in the 
choice of proxy for urbanization rate.  
Unionization was higher in the Midwest region. States in the South are also 
related to union density and their impact is negative and significant. This is not surprising 
since the South region is thinly unionized. The West region has a positive and significant 
impact in 2005; however, the Northeast region has no significant impact on union density 
in any year. Regional differences are not only important with respect to industry 
concentrations and economic development, which impact union density, but also capture 
the attitudes of workers towards unions.   
The share of goods-producing industries was removed from our analysis at the 
state level due to multicolinearity problem between this variable and the share of the 
blue-collar workers. We will discuss industry‟s effects on unionization in our state-
industry level regression analysis and we will report those results next.  Moore and 
                                                          
7
 We also replaced minority share of the labor force with Blacks in the labor force; however, our results for 
Black share of the labor force were similar to minority share. 
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Newman‟s results for goods producing industries did not reach any statistically 
significant levels.  
The percent of the labor force in a state who are employed in firms with more 
than 500 employees is positively related to union density in all our models, but its 
coefficient is not statistically significant. We expected to have a positive sign for this 
coefficient, because large firms are less costly for unions to organize and are more 
profitable due to economies of scale. 
RTW laws are negatively related to union density in all our models. This variable 
is a negative determinant of unionization and its coefficient is highly significant in 1985 
and the entire period. Recent literature on the RTW states also concludes the negative 
impact of such laws on union density due to free rider problems. As of this writing, 22 
states have passed such laws and these states are on average less unionized than national 
averages and non-RTW states.  
The proxy for management opposition towards unionization that we created in 
this study meets our expectations. In all models, this variable shows that employer 
opposition is a negative determinant of union membership rate with a statistically 
significant coefficient. This result gives us confidence in our choice for this variable and 
it is consistent with the wider literature. These results confirm the hypothesis that 
management resists unionization for economic reasons. Employer opposition to 
unionization for union workers means reduced bargaining power and lower wages. 
Union decertification variable, which measures employer‟s aggressiveness in 
decertifying unionized firms, does not impact union density in a significant way, at least 
in our models. In this study, we created this variable as a control for management 
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aggressiveness engaging in decertification of existing unions. The effect of this variable 
might partly have been captured by the strong influence of employer opposition on union 
density in these models. 
Finally, union activism, another variable that we created in this study to measure 
union activities in recruiting new members, produced strong results in these regressions 
and is a positive determinant of union membership rate. Admittedly, unions are also very 
active recruiting new members outside NLRB election procedures (card check) and we 
are capturing part of their activities through NLRB reports. Unions have been trying to 
push for new laws bypassing NLRB„s bureaucratic election procedures; however, as of 
this writing, they have not succeeded. Nevertheless, our results indicate that unions have 
been trying to recruit as many members as they can through NLRB channels. Union 
activism impacts market outcome in many ways. Two frequently quoted impacts of the 
unions in the labor market are wages and employment. Unions redistribute income 
through collective bargaining in favor of their members and they impact the level of 
employment.  
Results for state-industry models (Tables 6 and 7), although similar to the state 
level results, differ in two respects. First, variables union wage gap, female share, and 
urbanization rate produce stronger results. Second, state-industry results produce more 
detailed information for our eight industries.  
Union-nonunion wage gap at the state-industry is directly related to the union 
membership rate and has a statistically significant impact in two out of four regressions. 
The sign for this variable is also as we expected. At the state level, we had mixed signs 
for this variable with an overall (pooled) negative sign. The impact of wage gap on union 
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density, therefore, is better captured at the industry level than in the aggregate. Female 
share is also a negative determinant of unionization at the state-industry level and its 
coefficient is highly significant. These results are also consistent with the literature that 
female workers in the private sector are less likely to unionize due to part time 
employment and the concentration of women in less unionized sectors. This variable did 
not produce the same results at the state level. Results for the urbanization rate at the 
state-industry level are a positive determinant of union density and its coefficient is 
statistically significant in three out of the four models. At the state-level analysis, this 
variable was positively related to union density; however, it did not have significant 
impact on unionization. Results at the state-industry level are consistent with Hirsch 
(1980) and Moore and Newman‟s study (1988).  
Results for industries are as follows. Mining and construction are two industries 
that are negatively related to union density and their coefficients are statistically 
significant. These results do not meet our expectations for these industries, which are 
traditionally strong in union membership. Construction industry experienced stiff 
competition from nonunion firms in this period. The share of construction industry as a 
percent of the private sector employment has risen for the past three decades; however, 
union density in that industry has declined over the same period. The manufacturing 
sector experienced an intense competition by globalization in the past three decades. 
They have lost a great deal of market share to other country‟s manufacturers operating in 
and outside of the US. Many manufacturing jobs moved to China or other Asian 
countries in this period and foreign manufacturers such as Toyota Motor Company, 
which moved part of its manufacturing operation into the US, has been operating free of 
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unions (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2006). However, our results for the manufacturing 
sector are positive and the coefficients for durable and nondurable manufacturing are 
positively related to unionization at the state-industry level. 
Union density is also positively related to transportation, communication, and 
utilities and their coefficients are statistically significant in all our regressions. This was 
expected, since these industries operate more in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets and 
barriers to entry are high. Surprisingly, union density is also higher in service and retail 
industries for these periods. Traditionally, these industries were not unions‟ stronghold in 
the past.   
Our new variables, employer opposition, decertification, and union activism, have 
similar results as those at the state level. The variable for management opposition towards 
unionization shows that employer opposition is inversely related to the union 
membership rate at the state-industry. The union decertification variable, which measures 
employer‟s aggressiveness in decertifying unionized firms at the state level, is also 
inversely related to union density at the state-industry level in our pooled model. These 
results are different from our state level models, where the decertification variable did not 
impact union density much. Management opposition towards union organizing drives and 
employer aggressiveness to decertify existing unions are two of the three new variables 
that we introduced in this paper. These two variables which measure employer position 
towards unionization meet our expectation and correctly reflect underlying assumptions 
of the theory of the firms. Firms are assumed to maximize profit and minimize costs. 
Unions raise wages, which are a big part of input costs.      
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Union activism again is directly related to union density and unionization 
increases as union activism increases in all models. The results for this variable have 
been consistent for all models both at the state and state-industry regressions. These 
results meet our expectation for this variable and correctly reflect our choice. 
Although the results for the state and state-industry are very similar in the 
determinants of union density across states and over time, there exist some differences. 
The state-industry results, although confirming state level results, are more reflective of 
the determinants of unionization in line with our expectations and that of the literature.  
Next, we proceed to exploring the sources of change in average union density 
over time through Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Since simultaneity did not emerge as a 
problem, we base Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition from OLS regression. The Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition results for the state-level observation are listed in Table 8. As 
reported in Table 8, column one, a total of 6.09 percentage point decline in average union 
density occurred between 1985 and 2005. The decomposition shows a 10.63 percentage 
point reduction in unionization that is due to endowment effect and 4.53 percentage point 
favorable change in unionization due to coefficient effect. The explained portion of the 
decomposition is statistically significant at .05 level. 
The coefficients for management opposition and union activism are statistically 
significant in the explained portion of the decomposition. In the unexplained portion, the 
coefficients for earning, female share, employer opposition, and two regional variables 
are statistically significant in the Oaxaca decomposition. Union activism and 
management opposition, although statistically significant, accounted for a 2.33 and 1.75 
percentage point decline. In the unexplained part of the decomposition, the share of 
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female workers, earnings, and management opposition had a huge positive impact on 
union density over this period; however, the net result was just 4.53 percentage points 
due to a large negative intercept. The coefficients that are statistically significant 
contributed to union density between 34.37 and less than .70 percentage points. Female 
share is the largest contributor among these variables and the West region is the smallest. 
Female share of employment has been growing over the past three decades and so has 
unionization among female workers. The second and third largest contributors to union 
density in the unexplained part were earnings and management opposition, which 
accounted for 25.12 and 24.29 percentage points, respectively. The big positive 
percentage point for employer opposition reflects the decline in the employer opposition 
effects on the extent of unionization over time.  
Table 8, column two, shows that a 3.81 percentage point of the decline happened 
between 1985 and 1995, and column three reports that a 2.28 percentage point decrease 
happened between 1995 and 2005. These statistics indicate that a big portion of the 
decline in union density occurred in the first decade of our study. Decade-by-decade 
decomposition gives a more detailed explanation with respect to the roles of the 
determinants of union density. For example, we previously reported that the coefficient 
for earnings was statistically significant in the unexplained portion of the decomposition 
at the state level between 1985 and 2005. The coefficient for earning is statistically 
significant for the first decade and not for the second decade. However, the coefficient for 
union activism is not significant in the first decade but it is significant in the second 
decade. These results mean the decline for this determinant occurred recently. We also 
reported a big positive contribution in the unexplained portion by employer opposition, 
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which again happened in the earlier decade and was minimal in the later decade. This 
detailed examination of each decade shows not only that union density decline slowed 
down in recent years, but also shows factors that caused the slowdown in the decline. 
A total of 7.07 percentage point decline in average union density occurred 
between 1985 and 2005 at the state-industry level (Table 9). The decomposition shows a 
6.64 percentage point favorable change in unionization that is due to endowment effect 
and 13.72 percentage point reduction in unionization due to coefficient effect. 
Furthermore, Table 9 reports that explained and unexplained portions of decomposition 
as a whole are both statistically significant. The coefficients for earnings, blue-collar, 
management opposition, union activism, and mining are statistically significant in the 
explained portion of the decomposition. In the unexplained portion, the coefficients for 
female share, union activism, two regions, and all industries but mining and durable 
goods are statistically significant in the Oaxaca decomposition. Average earnings 
accounted for a 10.82 percentage point increase and average share of blue-collar workers 
and average union activism accounted for a 1.84 and 1.90 percentage point decrease, 
respectively.  Management opposition and mining accounted for less than one percentage 
point. In the unexplained part of the decomposition, the effect of female share, union 
activism, and construction industry accounted for 9.75, 1.63, and 1.58 percentage point 
increase, respectively. Regions, nondurable, retail, transportation, utility, communication, 
and wholesale trade each accounted for less than one percentage point except for the 
service industry which accounted for a 1.37 percentage point decrease.  
Results for state-industry in the decomposition model are similar to the state level 
decomposition with some differences. Similarities are in the determinants of union 
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density such as management opposition and union activism impacting unionization over 
time. Dissimilarities arise in earnings and blue-collar workers. For instance, share of 
blue-collar workers had a negative impact on unionization at the state level; however, its 
coefficient was not statistically significant. At the state-industry level, this coefficient 
was negative and statistically significant. Another big difference between state and state-
industry decomposition is the magnitude of the intercepts. We reported a negative 93.78 
percentage point in intercept at the state level in Table 8. This figure for state-industry 
level is 28.31 percent, which is less than a third of the state level. These results mean that 
industry control offers some detailed explanation for analysis of union density with 
respect to determinants of unionization that are not immediately obvious at the state level 
analysis.  
At the state-industry level, a 4.92 percentage point decline occurred between 1985 
and 1995 and 2.14 percentage point between 1995 and 2005. These results are similar to 
the state level results, where the earlier decade experienced larger union density decline 
than the later decade. Decade by decade results are reported in columns two and three in 
Table 9. 
 Overall, our results for determinants of union density across state and state-
industry and over time are very similar. State-industry analysis is more precise due to 
more observations at the industry levels.  
   
 Conclusion 
This study explored the factors that accounted for variations in the US private 
sector union density at the state and state-industry levels in 1985, 1995, and 2005, and 
measured the magnitudes of the changes that are attributable to the changes in 
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endowments and returns to endowments utilizing decomposition analysis. A reduced 
form model of union density was adopted and estimated for 1985, 1995, 2005, and a 
pooled regression over 1985-2005 periods. We employed determinants of unionization 
that were also utilized by other studies in interstate and SMAS. In addition to 
examination of a time period not covered by previous studies, the major contribution of 
our paper is development and inclusion of new measures of union and management 
behavior. Two of the three variables that we introduced (employer opposition and union 
activism) turned out to be significant determinants of union density. The variable for 
employer opposition significantly reduced union density while union activism had the 
opposite effect and positively impacted unionization. Our third proxy for employer‟s 
aggressiveness via attempts to decertify existing unions had no significant impact on 
union density. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method was utilized to examine in 
more detail the causes of union density decline over years. As was reported above, most 
determinants of union membership rate across state and state-industry also caused the 
decline over time. The overall contribution of the endowment part of the decomposition 
of union density for the state and state-industry were -10.63 and 6.64 percentage point 
and for the coefficients (unexplained part) were 4.53 and -13.72, respectively, which led 
to a net decline in union density for the periods of our study. Average earning and female 
share are positive contributors in the endowment effects and blue-collar workers, union 
activism, and employer opposition are negative contributors. In the coefficient effects, 
female share and employer opposition account for positive contributors. The biggest 
single negative contributor to the unexplained part is the intercept or the shift, which are 
minus 93.72 and 28.31 percentage point for state and state-industry, respectively.  
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Furthermore, we employed a state-industry level analysis that is unique to this 
study and it was very helpful to shed more light on the significance of different industries 
in our study. 
Our results show that union density is positively determined by the level of 
earnings, share of blue-collar workers in the labor force, and union activism. 
Unionization is found to be negatively impacted by employer opposition and RTW laws. 
Other variables in the model do not produce consistent sign or their impacts are not 
statistically significant. Regions, according to our analysis, play a significant role. We 
found, for example, the Midwest region is more likely to be unionized than the south 
region of the country. These results might be due to more favorable labor laws in the 
Midwestern region compared to the South region. Our state-industry level analysis shows 
that industries exhibit strong results for all four regressions.  
Overall, our model confirms some of the findings of the previous studies for 
determinants of unionization and more importantly, it verifies our choice of proxies for 












Table 1: Union Density in the Private Sector by State 
Year Median Mean STDEV      
    
1985 12.68 13.18 5.32 
1995     9.02    9.36 4.39 
2005 5.81 7.08 3.88 
Source: CPS- ORG files.    
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Figure 2: Distribution of Union Density by State-Industry 
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Table 2: Variables, Means, Standard Deviations, and Definitions (state level). 
Variable Mean STDEV Definition 
Dependent .0987 .0519 Percent of all private sector workers who are 
union members. 
Earning   4.1475    1.1877 Weighted average of male and female median 
earning in hundreds of dollars. 
Wage-gap  .4126 .1727 Percent wage-gap between union and nonunion 
workers. 
Female share       .4755       .0225 Share of women in the labor force. 
Minority share       .2003       .1560 Share of non-White workers in the labor force. 




      .3516 
 
      .4435 
      .0978 
 
      .0629 
Percent of workers employed in mining, 
construction, and manufacturing. 
Percent of the labor force in firms with more 
than 500 employees. 
Decertification .0039 .0038 Number of eligible voters in decertification 
elections/number of union members (employer 
aggressiveness). 
Activism .0024 .0015 Number of eligible voters in collective 
bargaining elections/number of nonunion 
workers (union activism).  
Management 
opposition 
.7737 .0703 Number of ULP cases against employers/total 
number of ULP (employer opposition). 
RTW .4133 .4940 Equal 1 in RTW state, zero otherwise. 
Urban .6698 .2115 Percent of state population living in metropolitan 
areas. 
Region   Four Census regions: South, West, Northeast, 
and Midwest. 
    
 
Table 3: Variables, Means, Standard Deviations, and Definitions (state-industry level). 
Variable Mean STDEV Definition 
Dependent .1347 .1171 Percent of all private sector workers who are 
union members. 
Earning   4.6135   1.6914 Weighted average of male and female median 
earning in hundreds of dollars. 
Wage-gap  .2954 .2565 Percent wage-gap between union and nonunion 
workers. 
Female share       .3581       .1811 Share of women in the labor force. 
Minority share       .1923       .1606 Share of non-White workers in the labor force. 
Blue-collar       .5348       .2519 Percent of manual workers in the labor force. 




Table 4: Results for Determinants of Union Density for OLS (equation (1)). 
 1985 1995 2005 pooled 
Earnings     -.0224       0.0253       0.0238       0.0127 
 (0.010)** (.018) (0.007)*** (0.007)* 
Wage-gap -0.0543 0.0375 0.0058 -0.0109 
  (0.058) (0.050) (0.025) (0.024) 
Blue-collar 0.0753 0.1178 0.2737 0.1994 
  (0.134) (0.136)    (0.075)*** (0.071)* ** 
Female share -0.0953 -0.3546 0.6198 -0.0204 
 (0.333) (0.267)  (0.202) *** (0.152) 
Minority share     -0.0619      -0.0071     0.0198    -0.0068 
 (0.059) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) 
Urban 0.0092 0.0234 0.0198 0.0338 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022) 
Firm size 0.0619 0.0640 0.0940 0.0393 
 (0.119)  (0.137)  (0.072) (0.066)  
RTW -0.0278 -0.0129 -0.0147 -0.0221 
 (0.013) ** (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) *** 
Management opposition -0.4069 -0.1424 -0.1015 -0.1391 
 (0.089)*** (0.079) * (0.044) ** (0.044) *** 
Decertification 0.3699 -0.4446 -0.3924 -0.6429 
 (1.324) (1.641) (0.631) (0.692) 
Activism 17.9958 12.2513 18.4436 12.9921 
 (4.918) *** (2.251)*** (3.771) *** (2.035) *** 
Northeast -0.0157 0.0154 -0.0278 -0.0054 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.012)** (0.009) 
Midwest 0.0474 0.0233 -0.0112 0.0195 
   (0.012)*** (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)** 
South -0.0088 -0.0233 -0.0436 -0.0247 
 (0.015)  (0.016) (0.009)*** (0.008)*** 
_Iyear_1995    -0.0347 
    (0.009) *** 
_Iyear_2005    -0.0599 
    (0.021) *** 
Constant 0.4633 0.1418 -0.4546 0.0611 
 (0.214)** (0.245) (0.147) *** (0.101) 
Observations 
R-squared     
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Table 5: Results for Determinants of Union Density for 2SLS (state). 
Variables 1985 1995 2005 pooled 
Earnings      0.0025      0.0173     0.0441     0.0293 
 (0.003) (0.026) (0.012)*** (0.014)** 
Wage-gap -0.0531 0.0286 0.0243 -0.0002 
  (0.059) (0.056) (0.022) (0.025) 
Blue-collar 0.1430 0.0975 0.3648 0.2494 
  (0.166)  (0.149)   (0.088)*** (0.085)*** 
Female share 0.0163 -0.3859 0.8448 0.0993 
 (0.342) (0.287) (0.255)*** (0.178) 
Minority share     -0.0473    -0.0126     0.0283     0.0001 
 (0.063) (0.034) (0.025) (0.026) 
Urban 0.0082 0.0269 0.0028 0.0265 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.030) (0.023) 
Firm size 0.0752 0.0549 0.1409 0.0588 
 (0.117)  (0.33) (0.088) (0.068) 
RTW -0.0233 -0.0143 -0.0089 -0.0192 
 (0.0153) (0.010) (0.010)   (0.007)*** 
management opposition -0.3353 -0.1438 -0.1148 -0.1289 
 (0.125)** (0.080)* (0.051) ** (0.047) *** 
Decertification 0.0688 -0.9288 -0.3596 -0.6895 
 (1.417) (2.039) (0.800) (0.650) 
Activism 16.1884 12.4510 17.5857 12.2621 
 (5.203)*** (2.346)*** (4.513) *** (2.163) *** 
Northeast -0.0122 0.0148 -0.0297      -0.0053 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.014)**      (0.009) 
Midwest 0.0460 0.0236 -0.0167       0.0185 
   (0.012)*** (0.014) (0.012)     (0.008)** 
South -0.0091 -0.0225 -0.0487    -0.0251 
 (0.016)  (0.015) (0.012)***   (0.008)*** 
_Iyear_1995    -0.0519 
    (0.016) *** 
_Iyear_2005    -0.1061 
      (0.040)*** 
Constant 0.2509 -0.2056 -0.7199 -0.0807 
 (0.321) (0.311) (0.198) *** (0.168) 
Observations 
R-squared     
      50 
0.78 
       50 
0.75 
      50 
0.83 
      150 
0.77 






Table 6: Results for Determinants of Union Density for OLS (equation (2)). 
 1985 1995 2005 pooled 
Earnings-ind    0.0386    0.0382     0.0276    0.0189 
   (0.014)*** (0.009) *** (0.005)*** (0.004) *** 
Wage-gap-ind 0.0133 0.0531 0.0344 0.0049 
  (0.018) (0.018)*** (0.017)* (0.012) 
Blue-collar-ind 0.3159 0.2791 0.2847 0.1879 
  (0.059) *** (0.052) ***   (0.53)***   (0.029)*** 
Female share-ind -0.2449 -0.1423 0.0289 -0.2443 
 (0.081) *** (0.083)* (0.076) (0.049) *** 
Minority share-ind    -0.0516    -0.0411     0.0086    -0.0230 
 (0.053) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021) 
Urban 0.0786 0.0535 0.0374 0.0428 
 (0.028)*** (0.029)* (0.023) (0.018) ** 
Firm size 0.0014 -0.0169 0.0183 0.0215 
 (0.089) (0.094) (0.082) (0.054) 
RTW -0.0314 -0.0183 -0.0259    -0.0306 
 (0.008) *** (0.008)** (0.007) *** (0.005) *** 
Management opposition -0.1961 -0.1497 -0.0511 -0.1524 
 (0.084)** (0.058)** (0.048) (0.038) *** 
Decertification -0.5206 -1.0451 -0.5886 -1.0072 
 (0.791) (1.648) (0.911) (0.546)*  
Activism 14.0662 12.9528 23.3454 14.8201 
 (3.034) *** (2.709) *** (3.749) *** (1.828) *** 
Northeast 0.0202 0.0085 -0.0198 -0.0010 
 (0.013)  (0.010) (0.009)** (0.006) 
Midwest 0.0562 0.0338 0.0089 0.0316 
 (0.012) *** (0.009)*** (0.008) (0.006)*** 
South -0.0029 -0.0211 -0.0319 -0.0228 
 (0.013) (0.010)** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** 
Construction -0.1134 -0.1040 -0.0556 -0.0374 
 (0.039)*** (0.032)*** (0.028)** (0.019)* 
Mining -0.1032 -0.1519 -0.1709 -0.0574 
 (0.037) *** (0.042)*** (0.038)*** (0.026)** 
Durable 0.0449 0.0048 -0.0202 0.0470 
 (0.024)*  (0.020) (0.016) (0.011)*** 
Nondurable 0.1051 0.0555 0.0290 0.1060 
 (0.026) *** (0.020)*** (0.018) (0.011)*** 
Retail 0.0860 0.0874 0.1025 0.0945 
 (0.030)*** (0.024)*** (0.020)*** (0.14)*** 
Service 0.1644 0.1301 0.0391 0.1250 
 (0.031) *** (0.031)*** (0.024)  (0.018)*** 
TransUtComm 0.1927 0.1233 0.0993 0.1758 




Table 6 Continued 
 1985 1995 2005 pooled 
 
_Iyear_1995 
    
-0.0562 
    (0.007)*** 
_Iyear_2005    -0.0943 
    (0.014)*** 
Constant -0.0539 -0.1229 -0.2664 0.0766 
 (0.111) (0.097) (0.084)*** (0.046) 
Observations 
R-squared     
       328 
0.79 
       318 
0.77 
       282 
0.77 
     928 
0.74 




















Table 7: Results for Determinants of Union Density for 2SLS (state-industry). 
 1985 1995 2005 pooled 
Earningsind     0.0520     0.0649     0.0371       0.0265 
 (0.018)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.005)*** 
Wage-gapind 0.0137 0.0652 0.0376 0.0059 
  (0.019) (0.020) *** (0.017)** (0.012) 
Blue-collarind 0.3426 0.3480 0.3279 0.2019 
 (0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.061)*** (0.030)*** 
Female shareind -0.2219 -0.0668 0.0859 -0.2245 
 (0.082)*** (0.097) (0.081) (0.050)*** 
Minority shareind      -0.0449    -0.0294     0.0162   - 0.0188 
 (0.053) (0.028) (0.026) (0.020) 
Urban 0.0780 0.0369 0.0264 0.0365 
 (0.028)*** (0.032) (0.024) (0.018)** 
Firm size 0.0202 0.0235    0.0185 0.0329 
 (0.087) (0.097)  (0.085) (0.054) 
RTW -0.0292 -0.0129 -0.0223    -0.0290 
 (0.008) *** (0.009) (0.007)*** (0.005)*** 
Management opposition -0.1509 -0.1255 -0.0640 -0.1460 
 (0.084)* (0.057)** (0.050) (0.039)*** 
Decertification -0.5258 0.6761 -0.5250 -0.9520 
 (0.786) (1.900) (0.941) (0.539)  
Activism 12.9530 11.7179 22.7005 14.3869 
 (2.953) *** (2.598)*** (3.806)*** (1.801) *** 
Northeast 0.0245 0.0096 -0.0185 0.0002 
 (0.014)* (0.011) (0.009)* (0.006) 
Midwest 0.0570 0.0356 0.0078 0.0326 
 (0.012) *** (0.009)*** (0.008) (0.006)*** 
South -0.0019 -0.0193 -0.0313 -0.0214 
 (0.013) (0.010)* (0.008)*** (0.006)*** 
Construction -0.1288 -0.1366 -0.0648 -0.0423 
 (0.040)*** (0.034)*** (0.029)** (0.019)** 
Mining -0.1308 -0.2492 -0.2239 -0.0776 
 (0.039)*** (0.057)*** (0.046)*** (0.027)*** 
Durable 0.0322 -0.0258 -0.0318 0.0404 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.019)* (0.011)*** 
Nondurable 0.0961 0.0301 0.0186 0.1015 




Table 7 Continued 
 1985 1995 2005 pooled 
Retail    0.1014 0.1197 0.1219  0.1055 
 (0.033)*** (0.028)*** (0.023)*** (0.015)*** 
Service 0.1738 0.1395 0.0391 0.1286 
 (0.032) *** (0.031)*** (0.024) (0.018)*** 
TransUtComm 0.1757 0.0864 0.0878 0.1674 
 (0.024) *** (0.025)*** (0.018)*** (0.010)*** 
_Iyear_1995    -0.0653 
    (0.008)*** 
_Iyear_2005    -0.1172 
    (0.017)*** 
Constant -0.1581 -0.3288 -0.3497 -0.0317 
 (0.125) (0.135)** (0.090)*** (0.050) 
Observations 
R-squared     
       328 
0.79 
       318 
0.76 
       282 
0.77 
       928 
0.74 










































Explained    
Earnings     -0.0535      -0.0215      0.0399 
 (0.047) (0.019) (0.026) 
Wage-gap 0.0010 0.0031 0.0015 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Blue-collar -0.0052 -0.0048 0.0002 
  (0.008) (0.008)       (0.001) 
Female share -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0002 
 (0.008) (0.004)  (0.001) 
Minority share      -0.0073      -0.0017      -0.0005 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Urban 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Firm size 0.0024 0.0014 0.0010 
 (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
RTW -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
No-RTW -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Employer opposition -0.0175 -0.0069 -0.0038 
 (0.007)** (0.005) (0.002) 
Decertification 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 
 (.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Activism -0.0233 -0.0048 -0.0128 
 (.006)*** (0.005) (0.004)*** 
    
Unexplained    
Earnings 0.2512 0.1877 -0.0083 
 (0.109)** (0.099)* (0.025) 
Wage-gap 0.0253 0.0349 -0.0132 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) 
Blue-collar 0.0799 0.0170 0.0623 
 (0.066) (0.073) (0.060) 
Female share 0.3437 -0.1244 0.4691 
 (0.1675)** (0.195) (0.164) *** 
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Table 8 Continued  
Unexplained 1985-2005 1985-1995 1995-2005 
Minority share 0.0219 0.0081 0.0072 
 (.013) (0.008) (0.011) 
Urban 0.0072 0.0095 -0.0024 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) 
Firm size 0.0147 0.0009 0.0138 
 (0.065) (0.075) (0.068) 
RTW 0.0028 0.0031 -0.0004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
No-RTW -0.0036 -0.0043 0.0005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Employer opposition 0.2429 0.2035 0.0325 
 (0.092)*** (0.098)** (0.068) 
Decertification -0.0028 -0.0028 0.0002 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
Activism 0.0007 -0.0156 0.0107 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) 
West 0.0068 0.0004 0.0063 
 (0.003)* (0.003)) (0.003)* 
Northeast 0.0025 0.0059 -0.0033 
 (0.002) (0.0034)* (0.002) 
Midwest -0.0077 -0.0053 -0.0024 
 (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.002) 
South -0.0027 -0.0040 0.0013 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant -0.9378 -0.3158 -0.6219 
 (0.269)*** (0.314) (0.267)** 
Observations            100 
 
         100 
 
         100 





































Explained    
Earningind     0.1082     0.04420      0.0640 
 (0.023)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)*** 
Wage-gapind -0.0007 -0.0011 0.0009 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Blue-collarind -0.0184 -0.0140 -0.0039 
  (0.007)*** (0.006)**       (0.005) 
Female shareind -0.0003 -0.0021 0.0009 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) 
Minority shareind      -0.0067      -0.0018      -0.0039 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Urban 0.0020 0.0006 0.0009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm size 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
RTW -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No-RTW -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employer opposition -0.0086 -0.0035 -0.0039 
 (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Decertification 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0001 
 (.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Activism -0.0190 -0.0043 -0.0134 
 (.003)*** (0.001)** (0.002)*** 
Construction -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0009 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mining 0.0040 0.0027 0.0014 
 (0.001)** (0.002) (0.001) 
Durable -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nondurable -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 





Table 9 Continued  
Explained 1985-2005 1985-1995 1995-2005 
Retail 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Service 0.0034 0.0016 0.0017 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TransUtComm 0.0029 0.0006 0.0016 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Wholesale 0.0016 0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
    
Unexplained    
Earningind -0.0662 -0.0016 -0.0646 
 (0.058) (0.047) (0.048) 
Wage-gapind 0.0060 0.0106 -0.0052 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Blue-collarind -0.0162 -0.0196 0.0029 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
Female shareind 0.0975 0.0372 0.0610 
 (0.038)** (0.039) (0.036)* 
Minority shareind 0.0162 0.0018 0.0135 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
Urban -0.0286 -0.0169 -0.0112 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) 
Firm size 0.0078 -0.0081 0.0163 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.055) 
RTW 0.0011 0.0026 -0.0015 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
No-RTW -0.0016 -0.0038 0.0022 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employer opposition 0.1150 0.0355 0.0783 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.060) 
Decertification -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0016 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Activism 0.0163 -0.0030 0.0181 
 (0.007)** (0.009) (0.007)** 
West 0.0077 0.0032 0.0042 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)) (0.002)* 
Northeast -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0023 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Midwest -0.0046 -0.0022 -0.0022 
 (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002) 
South 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0015 
 (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) 
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Table 9 Continued  
Unexplained 1985-2005 1985-1995 1995-2005 
Construction 0.0158 0.0056 0.0099 
 (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.005)** 
Mining -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Durable -0.0030 -0.0016 -0.0014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nondurable -0.0044 -0.0030 -0.0015 
 (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002) 
Retail 0.0077 0.0038 0.0038 
 (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004) 
Service -0.0137 -0.0008 -0.0128 
 (0.006)** (0.006) (0.006)** 
TransUtComm -0.0083 -0.0062 -0.0014 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002) 
Wholesale 0.0038 0.0032 0.0013 
 (0.002)** (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant -0.2831 -0.1045 -0.1786 
 (0.129)** (0.135) (0.119) 
Observations            100 
 
         100 
 
         100 


















VARIATIONS IN STATE UNION DENSITY IN THE PUBLIC 
  
SECTOR: A COMPARISON OF COLORADO AND UTAH 
Introduction 
The big jump in union membership in the US public sector in the 1960s and 
1970s, its uneven growth across states, and its stagnation since the 1980s has led 
economists to examine public sector unionization and its determinants. The growth in 
public sector union membership is mostly credited to changes in the public‟s attitudes 
towards public sector unionization and adoption of collective bargaining laws by some 
states since the 1960s (Edwards, 1989; Feuille, 1991). Variations in union density across 
states and over time are related to the extent of the collective bargaining laws, which 
greatly varies by states (Freeman, 1988). States with comprehensive collective bargaining 
laws are more unionized than states without such laws. Although many studies conclude 
that variations in public sector unionization across states and over time are mostly related 
to variations in the state‟s collective bargaining laws, other determinants of public sector 
union membership have been less examined. 
Most studies of the determinants of union density, at least in the discipline of 
economics, take a quantitative/econometric approach.  While these studies have provided 
us with some insight, some of the phenomena that affect union density are states‟ specific 
characteristics that are difficult to quantify.  This paper takes another approach: a 
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comparison of Utah and Colorado, cases chosen because of their substantial similarity, 
including collective bargaining laws, in terms of the determinants of unionization, 
combined with their very different histories of change in public sector union density. This 
paper will explore the causes and consequences of the sea change in public sector 
unionization between Colorado and Utah for the period of 1983-2008. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time that such a comparison of public sector union density for 
these two neighboring states has been conducted. 
 
Literature Review 
Public sector unionization in the US jumped from 12.8 percent to 35.9 percent 
from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. This huge increase in public sector unionization 
coincided with a large drop in private sector unionization from its peak of 34.9 percent 
in the mid-1950s to 20.1 percent at the end of the 1970s  (Freeman, 1988).  A period of 
stagnation or low growth in public sector unionization began in the 1980s. According to 
Feuille (1991), these three decades brought dramatic changes to the composition of 
organized labor, in that public sector union density had surpassed private sector 
unionization.  
Prior to 1962, Wisconsin was the only state that allowed state employees to 
collectively bargain (Write and Gundersen, 2004). President Kennedy in 1962 signed an 
Executive Order (10988) allowing federal employees to bargain collectively. The 
creation of collective bargaining rights for federal employees and other favorable court 
cases towards collective bargaining inspired many other states to adopt collective 
bargaining laws for state employees, which resulted in an increase in public sector union 
membership (Freeman, 1988; Edwards, 1989; and Feuille, 1991). However, not all states 
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embraced collective bargaining rights for their state employees and some states even 
prohibit such laws.  
Colorado and Utah are among the states that have no public sector collective 
bargaining laws. However, Utah is a Right-To-Work (RTW) state and Colorado is a 
non-RTW state. RTW states prohibit the union security clause, which upon collective 
bargaining agreement between employers and unions requires union membership as a 
condition of employment.  
Figures 5 and 6 show average public sector union density for RTW states, non-
RTW states, Colorado, and Utah for the period of 1983-2008. This study starts with 
1983 because it marks the year in which the Current Population Survey started to report 
union data by states. Figure 5 shows that RTW states‟ unionization in the public sector 
varies from non-RTW states. Non-RTW states on average have gained union 
membership, whereas RTW states lost union density for the same period. Figure 6 
shows that Colorado and Utah have both lost union density in that period; however, 
Utah had a much larger decline. At the beginning of the period, Utah had higher 
unionization in the public sector, but it ended up with a lower union density.   
 Why do Colorado and Utah have a different history in their public sector 
unionization profiles, despite having many similarities such as collective bargaining laws, 
region, and private sector unionization with respect to determinants of public sector 
unionization? In order to answer this question, this paper will review the determinants of 
union density in the empirical literature. 
Most empirical studies of the determinants of union density, at least in the field of 
economics, use a reduced form of supply and demand for union services. The theoretical 
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model underlying previous econometric studies assumes that union density is determined 
by the interaction of supply and demand for union services, and the density changes with 
factors that affect the supply and demand relationship. Union membership is assumed to 
be an asset that brings a flow of services to utility maximizing individuals (Hirsch, 1980). 
The demand for union services depends negatively on the price of these services and 
positively on the income (wealth) of the individuals, assuming union services are normal 
goods. Taste or preference and relative attractiveness of the price of alternatives are also 
considered on the demand side. The supply of union services positively depends on the 
price and negatively on the cost of providing such services. Since the price of union 
services is not observable, empirical studies estimate a reduced form of supply and 
demand which eliminates the price of union services. Thus, union density is estimated as 
a function of a set of variables that are expected to determine the location of supply and 
demand for union services. One difficulty encountered in this approach is that many of 
the determinants of supply and demand for union services are not directly observable or 
quantifiable and are therefore measured by proxies. 
A set of variables that are frequently used as determinants of union membership 
across time and space are economic factors, composition of the labor force (Hirsch, 
1980), state collective bargaining laws (Ichniowski, 1988), public attitude (Edwards, 








Determinants of the Public Sector Union Membership 
Economic factors  
Government expenditure. A growth in demand for government services will result 
in demand for more public employees and public expenditures. The high growth period in 
public sector unionization in the 1960s and 1970s in the US coincided with a high growth 
in state and local government expenditures and employment (Edwards, 1989).  A growth 
in demand for government services can occur in states with higher than average income 
(GDP by state) growth or changes in demographics. Demand for government services can 
be on average higher in a state experiencing higher than national average population 
growth. Public employment growth, due to rapid economic growth of a state, has a 
positive impact on unionization, because it reduces employer retaliation in the tighter 
labor market and reflects higher organizing funds and activities for unions (Schnaubel, 
2003). Changes in demographics will also impact government services. For example, an 
aging population in a state will demand more public assistance or states with above 
average fertility will spend more on education.  
Wages. Union wages are included in individual and aggregate level studies of the 
determinants of union membership as a proxy for wealth or permanent income. As wealth 
or permanent income increases, the demand for union membership rises, because union 
services are assumed to be a normal good. Unions are also known to raise wages for their 
members above those of nonunion employees. Hence, the ability of the unions to raise 
wages and the effect of higher wages on the levels of unionization led researchers to treat 





The composition of the labor-force 
Labor-force characteristics such as age, gender, race, and the level of education 
are determinants of union membership, which differ among employees.  
Age. Older employees are expected to be more likely to join unions, because they 
are more attached to the labor market, less mobile, and have high expectations from 
unionization on the one hand. On the other hand they may be less inclined to unionize, 
because of a shorter time period receiving nonpension benefits; therefore, the net effect of 
age on union density may be minimal (Hirsch, 1980). 
Gender. Female employees are less attached to the labor market and the benefits 
of being a union member may be small for them; therefore, they are expected to affect 
unionization negatively.  
Race. The expected impact of non-White employees on unionization is mixed. On 
the one hand, their benefit from unionization is greatest and, on the other hand, 
discrimination by unions may prevent their membership (Hirsch, 1980).  
Education. The level of education is found to be negatively related to 
unionization, because higher education and skills lead to stronger bargaining power and 
less dependence on unions.  
 
State laws 
State governments widely regulate the process of union representation in the 
private sector as well as the public sector (Freeman, 1988). Comprehensive collective 
bargaining laws by states for police, firefighters, and teachers are examples of such 
regulation. States with comprehensive collective bargaining laws reduce costs of 
organizing and management opposition. For instance, RTW states prohibit unions from 
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requiring union membership as a condition of employment, hence promoting free riders 
and increasing collective bargaining costs. Absent any collective bargaining laws, 
management is not required to bargain with unions, hence making unions ineffective in 
their efforts. 
State bargaining laws are relevant to public sector unionization, because they 
affect the outcomes in the labor market. For instance, prolabor laws allow unions to 
achieve more benefits for their members with less cost, because unions need not spend 
their time and their resources to convince management or legislators to commit to 
contracts. Colorado and Utah are very similar in their public sector labor laws as 
evaluated by Valletta and Freeman (1985).  
RTW laws reduce unionization due to the free rider problem (Ichniowski and Zax, 
1991; Moore 1998). Colorado is a non-RTW state in comparison to Utah; however, the 
Colorado Labor Peace Act (CLPA), which was enacted in 1943, is a precursor to the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The CLPA makes Colorado a modified RTW state (Hogler and 
Shulman, 1999). One provision of the RTW law allows states to outlaw the union 
security clause, which requires nonunion members to become union members within a 
specified period upon employment. CLPA requires unions to conduct a secondary 
election for establishing a union security clause. A super majority (3/4) of workers voting 
in the second election or a majority of eligible voters in the unit (whichever is greater) is 
required to establish a union security clause (Hogler and Shulman, 1999).  
 
Public attitudes 
Changes in public attitudes towards unions affect unionization (Lipset, 1986; 
Edwards, 1989). Public opinion is also influenced by advertising, family, community 
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standards, and ideology (Albelda et al., 2001). Individual behavior is guided by lifestyle, 
adage, codes of behavior, which are obtained from family and other institutions such as 
church (North, 1981). Favorable attitudes may lead to laws that are more union friendly 
or elections of public managers who commit to collective bargaining contracts, hence 
reducing union‟s organizing costs and increasing unionization. 
 
Employer resistance 
Public managers are charged with allocating the tax payer‟s money and providing 
needed services under budget constraints. Although public sector managers are unlikely 
to commit unfair labor practices as often as private sector managers do (Freeman, 1986), 
lack of collective bargaining laws and a majority political party controlling a state‟s 
legislation can resist unionization by not committing to any contracts, or blocking the 
passage of any favorable labor laws which would reduce a union‟s organizing costs. For 
example, a Republican majority in a state may push laws that favor business over labor. 
If union leaders can neither sign any contracts with management nor achieve any benefits 
for their members, they cannot convince potential members to join the unions.  
  
Union performance 
There are three hypotheses with respect to how union performance may have 
promoted a declining unionization rate (Freeman, 1988). First, unions may have poorly 
represented their members, which Freeman dismisses due to unions‟ wage and benefit 
achievement for their members and polls showing member satisfaction with their unions. 
Second, unions may not have allocated enough resources to recruit new members, which 
Freeman finds support for. However, Yates (2009) stated that unions‟ financial support 
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for new recruitment has improved since 1995. Third, union performance may have 
declined due to increasing management opposition towards collective bargaining due to 
unions‟ achievement of higher wages compared with nonunion workers, which Freeman 
again finds support for. In the public sector, union performance not only depends on the 
union‟s allocation of resources towards new recruitment, but more importantly it depends 
on the state‟s collective bargaining laws and management perception towards unions. 
Kate Bronfenbrenner (1997) takes up the issue of unions‟ strategy and states that certain 
union tactics are useful to win union elections and are important determinants of union 
organizing success. She demonstrates that a rank-and-file organizing strategy, getting all 
the members involved, could improve union organizing success. She concludes that if the 
organizers employ all elements of rank-and-file intensive campaigns, the probability of a 
successful election would be significantly higher.  
 
Public Sector Unionization in Colorado and Utah 
Utah had the biggest drop in public sector union density among all 50 states 
between 1983 and 2008, whereas Colorado‟s public sector unionization experienced a 
much smaller drop for the same period. This study hypothesizes that a decisive majority 
by the Republican party afforded by a change in public attitudes towards their elected 
representatives and to a lesser extent a combination of economic and labor force 
characteristics led to a reduction of public sector union membership in Utah, while 
Colorado‟s unionization somewhat followed the national averages.    
Figure 7 is a scatter plot of unionization in the public sector in Colorado and Utah 
over the period of 1983-2008. It shows public-sector union density in Utah was higher 
(by 6 percentage points) than Colorado‟s at the beginning of this period and ended lower 
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(by 6.5 percentage points) than Colorado‟s at the end of this period. Although union 
density in the public sector shows considerable volatility year after year due to the CPS‟s 
small sample size, the trend in union density (the fitted lines) indicates a steeper decline 
in Utah‟s unionization when compared to Colorado‟s. Figure 7 shows that Colorado‟s 
unionization has fluctuated around the 24 percent mark for the entire period, but Utah‟s 
density, while showing a similar cyclical pattern, has fallen below the 24 percent level 
since 1997. 
Colorado and Utah experienced a different history in their public sector union 
density despite many similarities between these two states. One of the determinants of 
union density in the literature is the location (region) of a state. Economists use US 
Census regions to control for variations in employee and employer taste towards unions 
(Hirsch, 1980; Moore and Newman 1988). This proxy is commonly used to capture 
public attitudes towards unions. For example, it is generally accepted that the Southern 
region is hostile towards unions. Since Colorado and Utah are in the Mountain region, we 
can eliminate regional differences as a source of union density variations. However, some 
differences in public attitudes are not captured by a regional proxy. This issue will be 
further discussed below. 
Another determinant of union density is collective bargaining laws that make 
Colorado and Utah similar. Both states have overall similar collective bargaining laws for 
their public sector employees. According to Valletta and Freeman (1988), who 
constructed an index for collective bargaining between public management and state 
employees for each state, Utah and Colorado are very similar in their collective 
bargaining laws. This index includes laws affecting state and local public employees, 
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where local employees are divided into teachers, firefighters, police, and other locals. I 
will provide more details on each state‟s collective bargaining laws in the state laws 
section. A third similarity between Colorado and Utah is their private sector unionization, 
which may have an effect on the extent of public sector union density. A heavily 
unionized private sector can financially support public sector unions in that state (Waters 
et al., 1994). However, Colorado and Utah both have low private sector union density 
(below the national average). 
Before we compare the determinants of public sector union density between 
Colorado and Utah and their respective changes over time, I will compare the two states 
with national averages.  
Figures 8 and 9 show that public sector union density on average in the US did 
not change much, hovering around the 33 percent mark for the period of 1983-2008. 
Although Colorado followed the national averages with some slight decline, as is shown 
in Figure 8, Utah deviated sharply from the national averages (Figure 9). Indeed, Utah 
had the largest decline among all 50 states. This huge decline in Utah‟s public sector 
unionization compared to Colorado‟s and the national averages might be an indication of 
some important changes in the determinants of union density in Utah rather than in 
Colorado. However, this paper will examine both states with respect to determinants of 
union density.    
The Current Population Survey (Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups) divides 
public sector employment into three groups: federal, state, and local. The following 
scatter plot of union density for Colorado and Utah over the period of 1983-2008 at the 
federal level (Figure 10) shows that unionization at the federal level is flat with a slight 
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decline for both states. This means federal employee unionization somewhat follows the 
national averages. So, the decline must have come from other branches of government 
and therefore, we do not pursue federal employee union density. 
As we further divide government employees in subgroups such as state and local, 
the volatility of union density increases as sample size decreases. Figure 11 compares 
state public employees between Colorado and Utah. Obviously, volatility has increased 
and therefore, we rely on trends to interpret unionization. Unionization among state 
employees shows a steep decline in both states. Utah‟s decline is again greater than 
Colorado‟s. 
Figure 12, however, is very different. The trend in local public union density in 
Colorado was flat for this period, whereas Utah shows patterns similar to that of state 
employees‟ union density. Utah‟s local union density compared to Colorado‟s 
experienced a steep decline. This decline is consistent with other branches of 
government (except for the federal branch) and Utah‟s total public sector unionization. 
This branch of government, which includes teachers, police, firefighters, and other 
locals, is a big part of the differences between Colorado and Utah for this period. 
Teachers in particular are a big portion of total local public employees. Therefore, a 
closer look at teacher unions is warranted here. In the next section, we will examine the 
above-mentioned determinants of union density as they relate to the public sector and 
teachers‟ unions. 
 
Results for Colorado and Utah 
 
Economic conditions during the period of 1983-2008 measured by state and local 
expenditure per capita and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita are as follows: 
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Colorado‟s GDP per capita grew on average by 1.9 percent annually whereas Utah‟s 
grew by 2.1 percent. Colorado‟s public expenditure per capita grew on average by 5 
percent whereas Utah‟s grew by 4.7 percent. These figures show that government in 
Colorado had more rapid increases in spending per capita than Utah did, in spite of less 
GDP per capita growth. This is also consistent with Colorado‟s higher average public 
wage than Utah‟s.  Colorado‟s average public wage for this period was $18 per hour 
whereas Utah‟s was $16. If we assume union services are normal goods, higher wages 
lead to higher unionization.  
Labor force composition with respect to employment is summarized in Table 10. 
It shows that from 1983 to 2008, Colorado‟s population grew on average by 1.84 percent 
annually whereas Utah‟s grew by 2.17 percent. State and local employment (excluding 
federal employees) grew by 2.18 percent annually in Colorado, and 2.84 percent in Utah. 
These statistics show that Utah‟s population and state and local employment grew faster 
than Colorado‟s for this period. Colorado‟s state and local employment grew faster than 
its population as was the case in Utah. If higher employment growth should result in 
higher union membership due to a tighter labor market and less employer opposition, 
Utah should have had higher unionization at the end of the period, but it did not.  
Differences between the demographic compositions of the labor force in Colorado 
and in Utah for this period are as follows. Colorado‟s state and local employees were on 
average 40.29 years old in 1983 and 43.5 years old in 2008. Utah‟s state and local public 
employees were on average 40.65 years old in 1983 and 42.86 years old in 2008. 
According to these numbers, public employees in Colorado were slightly younger than 
Utah‟s public employees in 1983 and slightly older in 2008, which may not have any 
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significant impact on unionization. Colorado‟s public employees on average have more 
college education than Utah‟s public employees, which should make Colorado‟s 
unionization lower in the public sector. Thirty percent of Colorado‟s public employees 
had a high school diploma or less in 1983 versus 31 percent for Utah‟s public employees. 
However, these figures dropped over time to 17.5 and 22.3 percent in 2008, respectively. 
Both states have experienced an improvement in public sector employee education; 
however, Colorado ended up with a more educated public labor force. Colorado‟s public 
sector had more non-White workers (25 percent) than Utah‟s public sector (10 percent) 
had in 2008. This is an increase from 10 percent for Colorado and 7 percent for Utah in 
1983. Although the effect of race on the extent of unionization is mixed in the literature 
due to discrimination by unions (a negative effect) and minorities gaining great benefits 
from unionization (a positive effect), in the public sector due to antidiscrimination laws 
and contract compliance policy, discriminatory effects on unionization may be less than 
in the private sector, hence boosting unionization in Colorado during this period.  
Colorado and Utah, according to an index created by Valletta and Freeman 
(1988), have similar collective bargaining laws. The index, which varies from a low of 40 
to a high of 162, indicates where states lie on a spectrum from no provision for, or 
prohibition of collective bargaining to comprehensive collective bargaining. Colorado 
and Utah received 66 and 65, respectively. Although this index was created in 1984, such 
laws do not change much over time. Colorado and Utah have not changed any of the 
categories of the collective bargaining laws considered by Valletta and Freeman during 
this period. However, there have been some changes in dues check off and contributions 
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to political action committees during this period, which are reported below. For more 
detailed information on Valletta and Freeman‟s index see Valletta and Freeman (1988). 
Regional differences and voting records of the state representatives to the US 
Congress in the literature are proxies for public attitudes towards unions. The American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) Committee on 
Political Education (COPE) records each congress member‟s vote on issues that are 
important to labor and posts them on their web-site. These records indicate on average, 
Democrats heavily vote with AFL-CIO positions and Republicans against AFL-CIO 
positions. Utah voting records at the state level show that Utah residents slightly favored 
the Republican Party as their representatives over the Democratic Party up until 1980. 
From 1896 until 1980 Republicans controlled both the state house and the senate 57 
percent of the time and Democrats 43 percent (47 years versus 36, and one legislative 
session was a tie).  Although Utah has favored Republican representatives over 
Democratic, there has never been a time that the Republican Party controlled both 
houses with such a majority and for such a long time as has occurred since 1980. The 
longest time before the current dominance was between 1901 and 1915. The underlying 
reasons for recent Republican dominance in the state of Utah may include the Civil 
Rights Movement and the Feminist Movement, which were supported in large part by 
the Democratic Party and were opposed by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (LDS). Furthermore, the resurgence in the political scene of the Republican Party 
in 1980 with the election of President Reagan and a Republican governor in 1985 may 
have contributed to Utahns‟ sentiment towards the Republican Party in this period.  
Additionally, the election of Ezra Benson as President of the LDS Church in 1984 might 
80 
 
further have strengthened the Republican Party position in Utah. In the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s, Utah had a more diverse set of elected representatives than in any other 
decade. However, this changed in the 1980s as the Republican Party took over both 
houses by a ratio of 3 to 1. Tables 11 and 12 show the composition of Colorado and 
Utah‟s legislators and their party affiliations for the period of 1983-2008. 
The following paragraphs briefly touch on the events that led to the super 
majority control of the government in Utah by the Republican Party since the 1980s. 
Religion increasingly plays an important role in US politics since the 1980s. 
Layman (1997) concluded that there was a considerable change in the impact of religion 
on political behavior in the US for this period. The Republican Party has positioned 
itself as the party of choice for cultural conservatism. According to Campbell and 
Monson (2003), social issues in the past two and half decades have become increasingly 
significant to the electorate and Mormons as a socially conservative group found 
themselves more in agreement with Republican Party positions.  
Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1972 and sent it to the 
states for ratification (Crowley, 2006). Thirty eight states were needed to ratify the 
amendment to the US Constitution. Thirty five states ratified it by 1977. Colorado 
ratified the ERA in 1972; however, Utah never did. Five states ratified the ERA at first, 
but rescinded later (Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Tennessee).  
Congress extended the deadline to 1982, but the ERA was not ratified by that time 
(Crowley, 2006). The LDS church leaders announced their opposition to the proposed 
ERA to the US Constitution in 1976 (The New York Times May 6, 1981).  
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In 1980, which marks the beginning of a long and significant control of the state‟s 
political scene by the Republican Party, President Reagan received the highest 
percentage vote for a presidential candidate in Utah history. In June of 2004, on the 
occasion of Reagan‟s death, The Salt Lake Tribune filed this report for the historical 
presidential election in Utah.  
Utah's love affair with Ronald Reagan was cemented long before he 
became the 40th president of the United States in 1981… When Reagan 
defeated Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter in 1980, Utah gave him 73 
percent of the vote; a 20th-century record that eclipsed the 69 percent 
Utahns gave Franklin D. Roosevelt in his 1936 landslide….. when Reagan 
won by such a large margin here, he swept in with him such a horde of 
Republican state House and Senate candidates that the GOP gained a 
better than two-thirds, or veto-proof, majority in the Utah Legislature. 
(The Salt Lake Tribune, June 6, 2004) 
 
Colorado gave Reagan 55 percent of the vote.   
 
Finally, according to a report by The Salt Lake Tribune, when Ezra Taft Benson 
was elevated to the president of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, much of his energy 
was directed toward warning the LDS about the evils of communism. The paper reported 
that Benson opposed the civil-rights movement in the mid-1960s and quotes him saying 
“The so-called civil-rights movement as it exists today is a communist program for 
revolution in America.”  
The same article reports that in an interview with The Associated Press, Benson 
said “It would be impossible to be a liberal Democrat and a good Mormon.” (The Salt 
Lake Tribune, May 31, 1994). Furthermore, in another article, The Salt Lake Tribune 
reported that 
Today's tea party movement likes to trace its roots back to the 1700s, but 
the more relevant forebears may be the fervent anti-communists of a half-
century ago -- among them, Ezra Taft Benson. The one-time Agriculture 
secretary, who went on to become the head of The Church of Jesus Christ 
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of Latter-day Saints, was a tenacious defender of the John Birch Society 
and feared that powerful officeholders -- including a U.S. president -- 
aided the nation's "godless" enemies in undermining the Constitution. (The 
Salt Lake Tribune, November 13, 2010) 
 
The paper continued with publishing President Benson‟s letters to FBI director, J. Edgar 
Hoover, one of which read  
Word has come to me, not yet fully confirmed, that some of our liberal 
'soft-on-communist' groups are planning to put pressure on you to come 
out with a statement against the John Birch Society.  
 
He urged Hoover not to do so. 
It is my conviction that this organization is the most effective non-church 
group in America against creeping socialism and godless communism. 
(The Salt Lake Tribune, November 13, 2010) 
 
This dominant role by the Republican Party leads us to the next determinant of union 
density in the public sector. 
Management opposition in the private sector is measured by unfair labor practices 
(ULP) charged against management by employees and unions in each state. In the public 
sector, however, unfair labor practices are unlikely (Freeman, 1986). Most ULP charges 
are due to union organizing drives, strikes, and enforcement of contracts. Management 
opposition towards unions in the private sector is well documented. Although ULP in 
the public sector is unlikely, public managers who are opposed to unions, absent any 
collective bargaining laws, can reduce union influence by not committing to any union 
contracts or passing laws that hinder union influence. 
The Republican Party has a long history of siding with management rather than 
unions. For example, President Eisenhower in 1953 was the first Republican president to 
appoint two persons from a management background to the National Labor Relation 
Board (NLRB) and broke with the tradition of nonpartisan appointments of the board 
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members (Flynn, 2000). The NLRB is supposed to be an independent, nonpartisan board 
created to protect public interests. It is charged with conducting elections for 
certification and decertification of collective bargaining units and processing unfair 
labor practices by employers as well as unions. The five board members are appointed 
by the president and are confirmed by the senate for a 5-year term. A study of voting 
behavior of the NLRB members on unfair labor practices during the Eisenhower, Nixon, 
and Kennedy-Johnson administrations shows that the Democrats preferred a prolabor 
voting board and the Republicans desired a prolabor minority on the board (Delorme et 
al., 1981). A review of board member decision making and interpretation of the National 
Labor Relations Act on similar cases shows that board members from each party ruled 
differently on the same subject and the board members admitted that the NLRB is a 
“political animal” (Gross, 1985). Table 13 (a reproduction of two tables in Joan Flynn, 
2000) indicates board members rulings for different administrations.  
The AFL-CIO tracks the voting record of state representatives to the US Congress 
(Table 14). Each Congress member votes on varying issues that can impact labor laws or 
labor-management relations. The AFL-CIO expresses its preference on each issue and 
keeps a record of each political party member‟s votes. Table 14 shows Republicans 
voting overwhelmingly against the AFL-CIO position. 
 Over two-third majorities of both the House of Representative and Senate in Utah 
over this period were controlled by Republicans. The Republican Party controlled the 
governorship as well. Colorado‟s unions had their own share of difficulties with 
Republicans in that state; however, Colorado‟s Republicans did not control two branches 
of government for the most part as in Utah, and did not enjoy the same level of control.   
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These two neighboring states elected more Republican representatives at the 
state level than they did Democratic representatives in this period. However, Utah on 
average had more Republican representatives than Colorado did. For example, during 
the period of 1983-2008 Republicans on average controlled more than 70 percent of 
both the House and the Senate in Utah, and they have controlled the governorship since 
1985. Colorado on average has also had a Republican majority, however, less than two 
thirds during this period, and the Republicans lost their majority in 2005. Colorado has 
also had a Democratic governor since 1975 except for the period of 1999-2006.   
Unions‟ performance in the public sector as in the private sector partly depends 
on employer‟s perceptions of unions, labor laws, and unions‟ instrumentality such as 
members and nonmembers perceptions of the unions leaders. In the public sector, unions 
are perceived to be effective and instrumental by union as well as nonunion members 
(Kochan, 1979).  However, if unions believe that their efforts will not produce any results 
in a hostile environment, they may be reluctant to engage in organizing drives and 
allocate their resources towards organizing drives. It is difficult to compare union 
organizers and their effectiveness in recruiting new members between Colorado and 
Utah. The statistics show that Colorado‟s unions were more successful in keeping their 
level of union density than Utah‟s unions. However, Utah‟s unions had to deal with a 
more Republican majority in all three branches of government than Colorado‟s union did. 
This will lead us to summarize the above results for these two states. 
The changes in economic factors, the composition of the labor force, and union 
performance may have affected the variations in the public sector union membership rate 
between Colorado and Utah over the period of 1983-2008. However, a change in the 
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public attitudes in Utah due to political events unrelated to collective bargaining and 
unionization pulled Utah‟s electorate towards the Republican Party and caused a decline 
in Utah‟s public sector union density. 
Since the1980s, the Republican Party not only has controlled both the House and 
the Senate by a big margin in Utah, but it has also controlled Utah‟s governorship since 
1985. Colorado‟s political scene is similar to Utah‟s, however Colorado‟s Republicans 
never enjoyed the same levels of confidence and control during the same period. 
Republicans in general are probusiness and Democrats lean more towards labor. The 
voting records of congressional members representing states (COPE), NLRB member 
voting records (table 14), and historical records of the Republican and Democratic 
Parties are evidence for the above claims. The influence of this difference in political 
control, and its impact on unions, can be seen in the history of the paycheck deduction 
legislation in the two states.  
 
Teacher Unions and the “Paycheck Deduction Act” 
In 2001, Republican legislators in Utah passed the “Voluntary Contributions Act” 
which prohibits public employees from authorizing payroll deductions to a labor 
organization‟s political fund (http://www.utahsbr.edu/new05d_2001.html). A similar bill 
has been repeatedly introduced in Colorado, but never passed both houses of the 
legislature. The introduction of House Bill 179 by representative Chad E. Bennion (R, 
Murray) angered public employee representatives and forced them to take action against 
the act in the court. The Salt Lake Tribune reported that the Utah Public Employees 
Association asserted in a lawsuit that House Bill 179, introduced during the 2001 session:  
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curtailing political donations by public employees is a punitive attempt by 
Utah lawmakers to silence the opposition and is unconstitutional. (Salt 
Lake Tribune Apr 18, 2001. 
 
After 5 years of court battle between unions‟ representatives and state‟ representatives, 
the Salt Lake Tribune reported that:  
A five-year-old Utah law that has slashed the political clout of the 
schoolteachers' union has been struck down and a US district judge ruled 
that “the law is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.” (Salt Lake 
Tribune May 4, 2006)  
 
What was more interesting in that report was what was going on behind the scenes and 
the political motives of the legislators to defend a law that they knew would not hold up 
in a court of law.  
In 2001, Utah lawmakers approved the Voluntary Contribution Act, 
sponsored by former Murray Rep. Chad Bennion, on a wave of anti- union 
sentiment. Officially, the legislation was defended as a legitimate effort to 
protect government from the cost and hassle of setting aside money from 
public employees' paychecks that would be used for political purposes. 
But a partisan bent to the vote and behind-the-scenes arm- twisting 
suggested a more political motive. Legislative attorneys gave the bill a 60 
percent chance of being upheld in court. And Utah Attorney General Mark 
Shurtleff stood on the floor of the House and said he had a "gut feeling" 
the legislation was unconstitutional. But a few days later, after private 
discussions with legislative leaders, Shurtleff said the law would be "100 
percent defensible." Despite his change of mind, lawmakers pressured the 
attorney general to hire a private law firm to defend the law. (Salt Lake 
Tribune May 4, 2006) 
According to a report by Sheena McFarland, the lawsuit is still ongoing. 
The issue: In 2001, the Utah Legislature passed the so-called "Paycheck 
Protection Act," barring public employees unions from collecting money 
through payroll deductions for political activity. 
* The history: The Utah Education Association challenged the law as a 
violation of free speech rights. The union prevailed in the district court 
and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. But now the U.S. Supreme Court 
has decided to hear a similar case out of Idaho.” 
* What's next: The Utah Attorney General's Office and the UEA will file 
friend-of-the-court briefs with the nation's highest court. A ruling is not 
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expected before the fall and could come as late as next spring. (Salt Lake 




A similar bill (paycheck deduction for political purposes) has been introduced by 
Republican legislators in Colorado repeatedly since 1992 and was defeated every time. 
According to The Denver Post:  
In 1992, then state Sen. Bill Owens, R-Arapahoe County, sponsored a bill 
to prevent automatic payroll deductions for political purposes. It didn't 
pass. Similar measures have been introduced nearly every year since, but 
partly because of a threatened veto by former Gov. Roy Romer, they have 
mostly been approved in one house only to be killed in the other. The 
teachers' union has been using the payroll checkoff plan since 1992. A $ 1 
a month deduction is made for each covered teacher unless that teacher 
takes advantage of very narrow opportunities to opt out. The modest 
expense of making the actual payroll deduction falls to the school 
districts.When critics first questioned this practice and argued that school 
districts had no right to spend taxpayer money in furtherance of the 
union's political agenda, then-Attorney General Gale Norton was asked to 
issue a legal opinion. In October 1993, she advised that the checkoff 
program was legal in that it arose from collective bargaining agreements. 
That opinion made it clear that if the deductions were to be halted it would 
have to be through legislative action. (The Denver Post February 4, 1999) 
 
Public employee representatives such as teacher unions use the money received 
from political contributions to promote laws and regulations that benefit their members. 
Absent any comprehensive collective bargaining laws in a state, the fund is a source of 
power for unions to fight bills such as House Bill 179 or other related bills such as a 
public-funded private school voucher program in Utah.  The New York Times reported 
that Utah‟s legislature (controlled by Republicans) narrowly adopted a voucher program 
in February of 2007, which was opposed by teacher unions, the National PTA and the 
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  “A U.S. Supreme Court decision Tuesday validates a Utah law involving government employees and 
automatic payroll deductions, a measure that has been on hold several years since it passed in the 2001 




N.A.A.C.P., who believed the voucher program would harm public schools (The New 
York Times May 15, 2007).  
The voucher plan was not only opposed by unions and other organizations, but it 
also was opposed by the public. Utah‟s public schools are already underfunded due to the 
state‟s rapid population growth. According to the Utah State Office of Education 
(fingertip facts) for 2006, Utah ranked last among all states in per pupil spending. Utah‟s 
teachers received on average $40,000 salary compared to a $47,700 national average 
salary. Utah‟s average classroom was at 22 students compared to 16 students for the 
nation. According to Colorado‟s Department of Education, the average teacher‟s salary in 
that state was $46,000 in 2006 and the average classroom size was 17 students. 
Colorado‟s data are similar to the national averages. These statistics, and concerns that 
voucher programs would worsen them, may have been on voters‟ minds when they 
rejected the bill on a referendum vote. The Salt Lake Tribune reported that  
Not only did the voucher plan fail in every one of Utah's 29 counties, but 
an analysis by The Salt Lake Tribune shows it failed in nearly every 
district represented by the most ardent supporters of the voucher 
movement, in some cases by resounding margins. (Salt Lake Tribune 
NOV 13, 2007) 
 
A similar voucher plan was defeated twice in Colorado (1992 and 1994); 
however, in 2003, a limited voucher bill passed both Republican controlled houses and 
was signed by the Republican governor Bill Owens. The bill was a 3-year pilot program, 
which was supposed to take effect in fall 2004. A lawsuit by many organizations, 
including the Colorado Education Association, was filed against the bill in Colorado‟s 
district court. The district Judge declared the bill unconstitutional, which was upheld by 
89 
 
the Colorado Supreme court before it took effect.  The following are some excerpts from 
The Denver Post before and after the passage of the limited voucher program. 
Bill Owens signed the country's largest school voucher bill Wednesday, 
delighting flag-waving students and sparking talk of lawsuits from 
opposition groups.  Colorado voters twice rejected two private-school 
ballot measures. But Republicans, who control both legislative houses, say 
vouchers give parents more of a say over where they can send their kids to 
school. It is a pilot program, limited to no more than 1 percent of a 
participating school district's eligible enrollment in the 2004- 2005 school 
year. Enrollment is capped at 6 percent by the 2007- 2008 school year, 
when the program is reviewed. (The Denver Post April 17, 2003)  
The Colorado Supreme Court on Monday ruled that the state's voucher 
program unconstitutionally strips school boards of local control. Gov. Bill 
Owens signed the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program into law 
in 2003. It provides tuition vouchers to low- income students in 11 poorly 
performing districts. Under the program, eligible students would have 
received a voucher for up to about $5,000 toward tuition at a private 
school, said Lisa Knepper, spokeswoman for the Institute for Justice. The 
program was scheduled to begin this fall, but Denver District Judge Joseph 
E. Meyer III ruled in December that it unconstitutionally usurps local 
school boards' control over instruction. (The Denver Post June 29, 2004)  
  
The voucher plan passed in Colorado, also by Republicans, was different than the 
voucher plan in Utah. It was a limited pilot program for a limited number of students, 
who were poor and were in underperforming public schools. This plan might have been 
designed to help specific students and not to undermine public schools and the teacher‟s 
union in that state. Utah‟s plan was a statewide plan and included all students, whose 
parents wished to use public funds in the private schools. This plan might have been 
designed to promote private schools and undermine public schools and teacher unions.   
The voucher plan is one way to privatize education in a state and also minimize 
unions‟ influence in the public sector. Conservative organizations such as the Heritage 
Foundation and the American Legislative Exchange Council are especially active in the 
political arena and providing models for privatizing public schools (Laitsch, 1998). The 
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American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association (NEA) are 
among those organizations which oppose privatizing public schools. According to 
Laitsch (1998), in Colorado, the debate over the Colorado Tax Credit Ballot Initiative, 
which was intended to provide a significant tax credit to parents of students attending 
private schools, is similar to the debate in Utah and Arizona between supporters and 
opponent of tax credits. The supporters are fighting the education monopoly of the NEA 
and the opponents stating that the voucher plan will devastate public education.    
The effects of the Voluntary Contribution Act of 2001, the voucher plan, and 
constant attempts to weaken unions by Republican representatives are visible in the union 
density of teachers, who compose a large share of local public employees in these states. 
Teachers on average account for 36 percent of the local government employment in Utah 
and 28 percent of the local government in Colorado. CPS data, due to small sample sizes 
for teachers and other local employees, show volatility in employment and union 
membership. However, we can draw some conclusions from the trend in teacher 
employment, union membership, and union density. Although education is a part of 
overall state and local government employment, it is used here as an example of a wider 
phenomenon, not the sole or a unique locus of union decline, and suggests that these 
general political trends probably had more widespread effects. Teacher unions in 
Colorado and Utah have experienced decline during this period. However, the teacher‟s 
union in Colorado gained some membership on net whereas Utah‟s stayed flat. The 
Figures 13, 14, and 15 compare teacher employment, union membership, and union 
density between Colorado and Utah for the period of 1983-2008.  
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Employment of public sector teachers (K-12) in Colorado and Utah obviously 
shows an increase in this period. However, the union membership trends among these 
groups of teachers differ in these two states. Colorado shows a positive trend and Utah 
a flat to slightly negative trend. The trends in union density for teachers in both states 
are negative. However, Utah‟s teacher union density shows the same steep decline as 
Utah‟s public sector union density as a whole and Colorado‟s follows the same flat 
path with slight decline as Colorado‟s public sector, which is similar to national public 
sector union density.  
 
Conclusion 
In this study, a comparison of Colorado and Utah was chosen because of these 
states‟ similarities in terms of many of the determinants of unionization, combined with 
their very different histories of change in public sector union density.  Our data from CPS 
show that Utah had an unusually large decline in public sector union density (the largest 
decline among the 50 states), while Colorado‟s unionization followed the national 
averages. Factors that have led to the decline in public sector union membership in Utah, 
which was higher than Colorado at the beginning of the study period and lower at the 
end, were to a lesser extent due to economic factors, composition of the labor force, and 
union activities. More importantly, the decline in the public sector union density in Utah 
compared with Colorado was due to changes in political climate, which led to a super 
majority control of government by the Republican Party in that state. Republicans 
positioned themselves as the party of conservatism and Mormons, a socially conservative 
group, found themselves in agreement with Republican positions. This in turn led to 




Data Source: Derived from Current Population Survey  
Figure 5: Average Public Unionization in RTW and Non-RTW States for 1983 and 2008 
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Data source: Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Mcpherson 
Figure 7: Public Sector Unionization in Colorado and Utah 1983-2008   
 
 
Data source: Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Mcpherson 










































Data source: Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Mcpherson 
Figure 9: Public Sector Union Density in Utah and US 1983-2008 
 
 
Data source: US Census Bureau “Current population survey” 




































Data source: US Census Bureau “Current population survey” 
Figure 11: State Public Employee‟s Union Density in Colorado and Utah 1983-2008 
 
 
Data source: US Census Bureau “Current population survey” 






































Table 10: Annual Percentage Growth Rate in Population and Employment for Colorado 










State and local 
employment 
growth 
Colorado 1.84  2.22 1.84 2.18 
Utah 2.17 3.00 3.04 2.84 
Data Source: US Census Bureau “Current Population Survey” 
Table11: History of Colorado's Legislature Table12: History of Utah's Legislature 
Year Senate Control House Control   Year Senate Control House Control 
1983 21-14 R 40-25 R   1983 24-5 R 58-17 R 
1985 24-11 R 47-18 R   1985 23-6 R 61-14 R 
1987 25-10 R 40-25 R   1987 21-8 R 48-27 R 
1989 24-11 R 39-26 R   1989 22-7 R 48-27 R 
1991 23--12 R 38-27 R   1991 19-10 R 44-31 R 
1993 19-16 R 34-31 R   1993 18-11 R 49-26 R 
1995 19-16 R 41-24 R   1995 19-10 R 55-20 R 
1997 20-15 R 41-24 R   1997 20-9 R 55-20 R 
1999 20-15 R 40-25 R   1999 18-11 R 54-21 R 
2001 17-18 D 38-27 R   2001 20-9 R 51-24 R 
2003 18-17 R 37-28 R   2003 22-7 R 56-19 R 
2005 17-18 D 30-35 D   2005 21-8 R 56-19 R 
2007 15-20 D 26-39 D   2007 21-8 R 55-20 R 
2009 15-20 D 25-40 D   2009 21-8 R 53-22 R 
Data Source: Richard Poll and House        Data Source: Library of Colorado legislature 











Table 13: NLRB Board Members Voting on ULP 
Reproduced with permission from Flynn (2000) 
 
Member Bkgrd Votes Party President 
R. Kennedy (1971-75) Govt. 79% Pro-M Rep. Nixon 
Walther (1971-77) Mgt. 75% Pro-M Rep. Ford 
Miller (1971-74) Mgt. 64% Pro-M Rep. Nixon 
Beeson (Mar.-Dec. 54) Mgt. 63% Pro-M Rep. Eisenhower 
Rogder (1953-61) Govt. 61% Pro-M Rep. Eisenhower 
Farmer (1953-55) Mgt. 56% Pro-M Ind. Eisenhower 
Leedom (1955-64) Govt. 56% Pro-M Rep Eisenhower 
Pennello (1972-79) Govt. 53% Pro-M Dem. Nixon 
Bean (1955-60) Govt. 53% Pro-M Rep. Eisenhower 
     
Murphy (1975-79) Mgt./Union 54% Pro-U Rep. Ford 
J. Jenkins (1957-61) Mgt. 54% Pro-U Dem. Eisenhower 
McCulloch (1961-70) Govt. 56% Pro-U Dem. Kennedy 
Zagoria (1961-71) Govt. 57% Pro-U Dem. Johnson 
H. Jenkins (1965-79) Acad./Govt. 61% Pro-U Rep. Kennedy 
Brown (1961-71) Govt. 62% Pro-U Dem. Kennedy 
Truesdale (1978-79) Govt. 63% Pro-U Dem. Carter 
Peterson (1955-56) Govt. 63% Pro-U Dem. Truman 
Fanning (1957-79) Govt. 71% Pro-U Dem. Eisenhower 
Murdock (1955-57) Govt. 71% Pro-U Rep. Truman 
     
Dotson (1983-87) Mgt. 97% Pro-M Rep. Reagan 
Hurtgen (1997-2002) Mgt. 97% Pro-M Rep. Reagan 
Brame (1997-2000) Mgt. 90% Pro-M Rep. Clinton 
Cohen (1994-96) Mgt. 88% Pro-M Rep. Clinton 
Oviatt (1990-93) Mgt. 76% Pro-M Rep. Bush 
Raudabaugh (1990-93) Mgt. 65% Pro-M Rep. Bush 
Higgins (1988-89:96-97) Mgt. 59% Pro-M Rep. Reagan/Clinton 
     
Stephens (1985-95) Govt. 56% Pro-U Rep. Reagan 
Cracraft (1986-91) Mgt. 62% Pro-U Dem. Reagan 
Johansen (1986-89) Govt. 70% Pro-U Rep. Reagan 
Truesdale (1994-96) Govt. 72% Pro-U Dem. Clinton 
Devaney (1988-94) Govt. 73% Pro-U Dem. Reagan 
Babson (1985-88) Mgt. 73% Pro-U Dem. Reagan 
Gould (1994-98) Acad. 78% Pro-U Dem. Clinton 
Dennis (1983-86) Mgt. 90% Pro-U Dem. Reagan 
Fox (1995-2000) Union 91% Pro-U Dem. Clinton 
Liebman (1997- ) Union 92% Pro-U Dem. Clinton 







Table 14: State Representative to the U.S. House Life-Time Voting in Support of AFL-
CIO Position (2008) 
Life-time average percentage voting in support of AFL-CIO position  
State Republican Democrat State Republican Democrat 
Alabama 16.2 79 Montana 23 N 
Alaska 42 N Nebraska 13 N 
Arizona 12 92.25 Nevada 30 93 
Arkansas 14 88 New Hampshire N 97 
California 10.5 94 New Jersey 35.67 95.4 
Colorado 8.7 92.75 New Mexico 19.5 97 
Connecticut 45 96.5 New York 35.17 95.5 
Delaware 33 N North Carolina 15.67 90.6 
Florida 18 93 North Dakota N 88 
Georgia 8 88.7 Ohio 19.5 97 
Hawaii N 98 Oklahoma 10.75 62 
Idaho 10 N Oregon 24 92 
Illinois 26.75 94.3 Pennsylvania 30.88 95.5 
Indiana 12.75 90.8 Rhode Island N 97.5 
Iowa 10.5 93.3 South Carolina 9.5 89 
Kansas 15 87 South Dakota N 86 
Kentucky 17.75 94 Tennessee 12.25 81.6 
Louisiana 16.25 93.67 Texas 10.11 90 
Maine N 96 Utah 9.5 68 
Maryland 19.5 96.67 Vermont N 97 
Massachusetts N 96.7 Virginia 17.13 89.33 
Michigan 21.78 95.8 Washington 23 89 
Minnesota 13.67 91.6 West Virginia 48 94 
Mississippi 14 78.67 Wisconsin 15.67 94 
Missouri 18.6 91 Wyoming 8 N 
 
















Data source: US Census Bureau “Current population survey” 




Data source: US Census Bureau “Current population survey” 




















































Data source: US Census Bureau “Current population survey” 









































VOTING RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS  
BOARD MEMBERS ON UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE 
 CASES, 1993-2008 
 
Introduction 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) members are subjected to criticism by 
both employers and unions for their voting decisions on Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) 
cases. Empirical studies show that NLRB members who are members of the Democratic 
Party are more likely to vote in favor of unions while board members from the 
Republican Party are more inclined to vote promanagement (Delorme et al., 1981; Cooke 
and Gautschi, 1982; Cooke et al., 1995). These studies used data from the period between 
1955 and 1986. However, there is a body of evidence that indicates that voting behavior 
of NLRB members may have been more tilted towards union or employer since the 1980s 
than ever before, due to changes in the process of board members‟ nominations (Flynn, 
2000; Tope and Jacobs, 2009).  
The NLRB not only decides on ULP cases, but also oversees union organizing 
elections. If the NLRB favors one group over another depending on which political party 
has the control of the board, it could impact the level of union density. According to Tope 
and Jacobs (2009), unions‟ ability to grow by organizing new firms through the NLRB is
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sharply curtailed when Republicans control the presidency, NLRB, and the congressional 
oversight subcommittee, which supervises the NLRB. A change in the level of union 
memberships, in turn, has an impact on market outcomes. The level of trade union 
membership determines the extent of action a trade union enjoys, the union‟s capability 
for financial and organizational survival, the ability to influence employers, and its 
likelihood of being heard by the general public (Riley, 1997).   
This paper revisits the voting behavior of NLRB members over the 1993-2008 
periods. Similar to Delorme et al. (1981) and Cooke and Gautschi (1982), it will explore 
the relationship between a set of ideological, economic, and public opinion variables and 
board members‟ voting decisions. Its contributions to the literature are two-fold. First, it 
uses data for the period of 1993-2008, a period during which there were major 
transformations in labor management relations, but which have not been analyzed in this 
context before. Second, it will introduce several new variables to capture the impact of 
changes in the board nominee confirmation process that have taken place since the 1980s. 
Board members‟ ideology and background increasingly became more relevant in the 
selection phase and confirmation stage after the 1980s. Also, disagreement between the 
sitting president and the Senate on some board nominees became routine. According to 
Flynn (2000) strongly ideological candidates were recommended by unions/employers or 
selected by presidents, while more moderate candidates encountered serious opposition in 
the Senate. Another change in the process of NLRB nominations is the issue of the recess 
appointments. Recess appointments occurred when the president and the Senate 
disagreed on a board nominee. The president can appoint a nominee to the board, 
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bypassing the Senate, when Congress is adjourned. There were nine recess appointments 




There are three issues that make the NLRB a focus for criticism by employers and 
unions. These are the conflicting congressional intent in the acts, the vague language of 
the acts, and consequently the conflicting interpretations of the laws by the NLRB‟s 
members. Previous studies have explored these issues for earlier periods (Gross, 1985; 
Flynn, 2000).  
The NLRB is the governing body of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
which was passed by Congress in 1935, and is in charge of administering its laws. The 
NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, was intended to bring a balance between workers 
and employers and was projected to resolve labor relations problems through a system of 
self-government (Gross, 1985). In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA) also known as the Taft-Hartley Act. This act, although 
recognizing the Wagner Act as promoting collective bargaining, amended the act by 
prohibiting certain practices of unions, which would harm interstate commerce. In 
addition to the amendment of a union‟s unfair labor practices, the Taft-Hartley Act gave 
employers the same right (free speech) as employees (free choice and individual rights). 
Gross (1985) states that the Taft-Hartley Act “contains conflicting statements of purpose 
that open the national labor law to conflicting interpretations of congressional intent.” To 
sum it up, the Wagner Act promotes collective bargaining, while the Taft-Hartley Act 




In addition to conflicting congressional intent, the language of the NLRA is vague 
and leaves gaps in the statutory language that make it difficult to determine congressional 
intent, which are an invitation to varying interpretations by board members who must fill 
in the gaps. Gross (1985) states that a more disturbing criticism of the NLRB is its 
frequent change of alternative choices, with changes in board membership depending on 
which political party controls the White-House. This means a Republican led board may 
set precedent on a ULP case based on the Taft-Hartley interpretation of the NLRA, which 
will be overturned by the next board, led by a Democrat and the original interpretation of 
the NLRA.      
The political question addressed in this paper is whether interpretations of the 
NLRA by a board member on a ULP charge brought before her/him vary with political 
party affiliation of the board member, or the party affiliation of the administration that 
nominates her/him for the job. This issue led unions and employers to accuse board 
members of making labor laws instead of governing them, and taking sides on ULP 
cases. Previous studies found statistical support with respect to board members‟ voting 
behavior and their party affiliations whereby Republicans appointed by Republican 
administrations favor employers, and Democrats appointed by Democratic 
administrations favor unions in their decisions on ULP cases (Delorme et al., 1981; 
Cooke and Gautschi, 1982). A brief description of the process of the appointment of an 
individual to the NLRB and the charges of ULP cases from initiation to the board is 
provided below, which is followed by a brief review of three empirical papers that 





The process of appointment of the nominees to the NLRB  
The appointment process consists of two parts that involve the selection of a 
nominee by the President, and the confirmation of a nominee by the Senate. Each new 
board member serves a 5-year term with the option of reappointment, and board members 
are appointed in an alternating manner in which at least one new board member will be 
chosen each year. According to Flynn (2000), there have been two distinct eras in the 
process of appointment, 1950-1980 and 1980 to the present.  The difference between the 
two periods is the changing norms governing NLRB appointments. She characterizes the 
first era as a period in which the president chose a nominee from a short list of respected 
professionals in labor-management relations, whose names were provided either by the 
Chamber of Commerce (management), or unions, and submitted their names to the 
Senate for confirmation. Both management and unions exercised restraint in constructing 
their lists of nominees and understood that this was a repeating game, avoiding short term 
gains, and future retaliations (Flynn, 2000). The second era, however, marks a period in 
which more ideological candidates emerged from interested parties and more moderate 
candidates who were routinely selected and approved under the “old rule” encountered 
serious opposition in the Senate. This meant that involved institutions abandoned their 
cooperative spirit and became more polarized. According to Flynn, this was a general 
trend which may have had its roots in the Labor Reform Act of 1977, which passed the 
heavily Democratic House and died in the Senate following a filibuster led by Utah 
Senator Orrin Hatch. Labor then insisted upon an appointment of General Counsel‟s 
positions that violated the longstanding norm and caused Republican retaliation to Jimmy 
Carter‟s nominees thereafter. Flynn concludes that the old norm gave way to a new norm 
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in which the Senate took over some of what was previously the president‟s selection of 
nominees. By exercising power over the process of nominee selection, the Senate made a 
norm by offering the President a package of nominees, or the president‟s nominees would 
not be confirmed. Flynn states that the president relies on both sides of the political 
spectrum to fulfill his obligations to the public at the national level, but the senators, 
individually, represent a smaller constituency. This means a senator represents a state 
(red or blue) and is more likely to vote for a nominee that reflects her/his state‟s dominant 
view. However, a president represents all states (red and blue), hence she/he is more 
likely to nominate a moderate person that pleases both views (Flynn, 2000).  
 
The process of ULP charges 
 The 73
rd
 Annual Report (2008) of the NLRB states that ULP cases constitute a 
large part of the NLRB workload. ULP cases are filed with regional field offices against 
firms or unions by employers, employees, or labor organizations nationwide. An 
investigation is launched by the regional NLRB staff after the charges are filed. The 
professional staff of the NLRB determines whether the case violates the NLRA. If there 
is not a reasonable cause to believe that the NLRA has been violated, the case is 
dismissed. If the charges have merit, the regional director encourages the involved parties 
to pursue voluntary settlement. Those cases that are not settled will go before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for a hearing. After the ALJ hearing, the involved 
parties have to make their decision, whether to accept the judge‟s ruling or appeal it to 
the NLRB. However, the NLRB is not the last stop for disputed cases, and some ULP 
cases continue their journey to higher authorities after the NLRB‟s ruling. If either party 
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to the case is not satisfied with the NLRB decisions, the next step is to appeal the case to 
the circuit courts, or all the way to the United States Supreme Court.  
 
A brief review of three papers on NLRB voting behavior 
Delorme et al. (1981) is the first statistical analysis of the voting behavior of the 
board members on the novel cases that are reported in the NLRB annual report. Among 
many cases that come before the board members each year, some are more complicated 
than others and will set precedent for future cases. These “novel” cases are reported 
under the section “Unfair Labor Practice” in the NLRB annual report. Delorme et al. 
employed a binary choice model on votes by the NLRB members on the cases for the 
period of 1955-1975. Their paper hypothesized that board member‟s voting behavior on 
ULP cases was impacted by political considerations and economic conditions. Their 
political variables included political party affiliation of the board member, and the 
administration that made the appointment and the reappointment decision. The 
unemployment rate, aggregate income, strike days lost, and union membership at the 
national level are among the economic variables they utilize. They hypothesized that 
Democratic members of the board are more likely to vote prolabor and Republican 
members are more likely to vote promanagement. Democratic administrations prefer a 
majority of prolabor board members and Republican administrations favor a minority of 
prolabor board members. A reappointment of a board member is hypothesized to be 
positively related with prolabor votes because presidents, Republican or Democrat, 
historically reappointed members based on their voting records; in the past, they 
reappointed members that voted more prolabor, because union members constituted a 
large block of voters in the presidential elections and a sitting President did not want to 
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look antagonistic to unionized labor. According to the authors, union members are 
informed by their leaders about board nominees and the president‟s appointments. The 
effect of the unemployment rate on voting behavior was uncertain, because it depended 
on the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation and the goals of the administration. 
Aggregate income was expected to lead to more promanagement votes, because board 
members were reluctant to seek support for the administration in a period of prosperity. 
Nation-wide union membership rates were assumed to be directly related to prolabor 
votes, since a higher union membership lends more political support for the 
administration.  
The authors estimated a linear probability model in which the dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of the odds of the NLRB member voting prolabor in a specific 
year [log (pit/(1- pit)]. Their model estimated three separate periods: the Eisenhower 
administration (1955-1961), the Kennedy-Johnson administration (1962-1970), and the 
Nixon administration (1971-1975). Furthermore, they estimated a pooled regression for 
all periods from 1955 until 1975. For the entire period, they found the members‟ political 
party affiliations, the party of the administration appointing the board members, and 
reappointment were related to the voting decisions on the ULP cases. A Democratic 
administration increased the odds of voting prolabor. The odds of a prolabor vote were 
greater when the board member was a Democrat. A reappointed board member was more 
likely to vote prolabor. During periods of high national unemployment, the odds of a 
prolabor vote were greater than during periods of low unemployment. Other economic 
variables had mixed results having impact on the odds of a prolabor vote in one period 
and not in another period.  
109 
 
The article by Cooke and Gautschi (1982) is similar to the paper by Delorme et al. 
(1981) in terms of the period under study, and used a similar dependent variable, as well 
as cases that were novel, or set precedent for the future. Cooke and Gautschi also found 
that members were influenced by their own political party affiliations and the party of 
appointing administrations. However, they used a set of “public opinion” variables 
whereas Delorme et al. (1981) used economic variables in addition to the ideological 
variables. This difference sets these two papers apart. Public opinion variables included 
the percentage of Democrats in the Senate, public approval of labor unions using Gallup 
polls, and the annual percent of representation elections won by unions. However, in 
estimations, none of these public opinion variables were found to have a significant 
impact on voting behavior.  
The latest paper by Cooke et al. (1995) revisited the issue of NLRB voting on 
ULP cases and developed an alternative model to estimate a board member‟s decision 
making behavior on ULP cases. Their model not only included determinants of board 
members‟ voting behavior studied by other researchers, but also new factors such as case 
characteristics and the group context. “Group context” here refers to the composition of 
the panel making decisions on each case. For instance, which political party has the 
majority on the panel at the time of decision making? In contrast with the previous two 
studies, they did not use the novel cases that are reported by the NLRB annual report. 
Instead, they used a random selection of six ULP cases brought before the board each 
year between 1957 and 1986. They divided the cases into two distinct groups. Group one 
presented the cases that were complex and important; group two contained cases that 
were less important and simpler. Three criteria were chosen to distinguish between 
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complex and important cases, and those that were less important and simpler. Cases in 
which more than three members participated in decision making, which had a longer 
deliberation time, and which were reported in the NLRB annual report as novel were 
designated as important. The rest represented simpler cases. They implemented prohibit 
estimation of the two subsamples. The dependent variable was a binary variable, which 
was set equal to 1 if the vote was for the employer, and zero otherwise. In their later 
study, they used ideological, economic, and public opinion variables as their independent 
variables. They utilized ideological variables such as interaction of a member‟s party and 
the party of the appointing president, member party, and the party of the majority on the 
panel, and a series of interaction variables that reflected the weight of the ALJ ruling, and 
the finding of field officers on a board member‟s decisions. Economic and public opinion 
variables include the unemployment rate and Congress COPE (average percentage of 
Congress voting similar to the AFL-CIO‟s position on AFL-CIO selected bills). Their 
results indicated that the member‟s party and the party of the appointing president are 
significantly related to votes in those cases that are complex and important (20%) and are 
less related in those cases that are routine. In less important cases, they found a 
consistency between the decisions made by the regional office, the ALJ, and the board. 
The minority-majority status of the members on the panels also influenced the member‟s 
voting decisions. A Republican board member was more than twice as likely to vote for 
management when s/he was in the minority, relative to when s/he was in the majority on 
panels. Finally, they found some strong evidence with respect to economic conditions and 
public opinion variables. Consistent with Delorme et al., they found board members were 
more sympathetic towards the union than management when unemployment was high 
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and, in contrast to Cooke and Gautschi, they found strong evidence between members‟ 
voting decisions and public accountability. In complex cases, they found both COPE and 
RTW states were negatively related to promanagement member‟s votes. This meant the 
board members were more likely to vote against employers, if the case was originated 
from a RTW state in the South or a majority of Congressional members voted with AFL-
CIO in the decision year.   
 
NLRB Voting Behavior 1993-2008 
This paper uses individual board member voting decisions on “novel” cases 
reported in the NLRB Annual Report.
9
 We focus on these cases for two reasons. First, 
these cases set precedents for future cases and their complexity requires board member‟s 
interpretation of the NLRA. Second, they provide an opportunity for the board members 
to reveal, if any, their prolabor or promanagement preferences. Furthermore, Cooke 
(1995) stated that simple and routine ULP cases are not influenced by the board 
member‟s preferences. There were 295 novel cases that were reported by the NLRB 
annual report during the period of 1993-2008 (Table 15). In order to capture the full 
extent of the board member‟s preference towards management or unions, we excluded 
the following cases in this study. First, we excluded those cases that did not involve both 
unions and employers. These cases included charges that were filed by employees against 
unions or employers and vice versa. Furthermore, we excluded two ULP cases that 
involved unions against unions. Second, there were 13 cases in which the outcomes were 
not immediately clear to us. Unclear cases are those that contained multiple charges and 
the outcomes were partially pro-union and partially promanagement, making them hard 
                                                          
9




to categorize as pro-union or promanagement votes. In addition, sometimes panel 
members expressed various opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, depending 
on different parts of the charges. Two of these cases were already excluded due to 
employees being plaintiffs. Finally, in 2008, there was a period in which the NLRB 
consisted of only two board members during which time nine cases were decided. We 
also excluded seven of those cases from our regressions that involved unions and 
employers; two others were automatically excluded involving employees again. Out of 
the 295 cases, we included the remaining 223 cases for our analysis. Each ULP case was 
reviewed by a panel consisting of three to five board members. In this sample, there were 
750 observations (votes); 488 votes were prolabor and 262 votes were promanagement 
(65 and 35 percent, respectively). 
Table 15, column 2 lists the number of cases that we included in our analysis. Out 
of 295 ULP cases reviewed and decided by the board during this period, 220 were filed 
by the unions against employers. Fifty-two were filed by employees, and 21 cases were 
filed by employers against unions.  Column four shows cases that were excluded from 
our model. The ULP cases that we analyzed in our model comprise 75.6 percent of all 
“novel” cases reported in the NLRB annual report.  
Table 16 lists the board member‟s voting records, political party affiliation, and 
background. Gov. /Acad. means that the board member either worked for the government 
or had an academic job prior to her/his appointment to the board. 
The second column shows the percentage of average pro-union votes cast by the 
members for the period of 1993-2008. Note that two out of 21 members never voted pro-
union, while one member voted 100 percent pro-union, and three members voted over 90 
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percent pro-union. High percentages of pro-union votes came from Democrats with a 
union background and a low percentage of pro-union votes came from Republicans with 
a management background. There are four board members who are Republican that 
worked for management and voted on average between 55 to 65 percent pro-union. Three 
out of four served under the Clinton Administration, and one was appointed by President 
Clinton. Column three delineates the total votes that each member cast during this period. 
Again, there are large variations in the number of votes cast. Liebman had the greatest 
number of votes (114), followed by Battista (85), and Walsh (81). Column four lists the 
background of each board member before joining the NLRB. Columns two and four 
show that there was a relationship between the percentage of pro-union votes cast and a 
member‟s background. Members with a union background voted overwhelmingly in 
favor of unions, and members with a management background voted in favor of 
employers. Those members with a government or academic background voted overall in 
favor of unions rather than employers except for member Schaumber.  
To visualize the voting behavior of each board member with respect to her/his 
background, we constructed a two-way plot for each member over the period of 1993-
2008. Figure 16 shows the percentage of the pro-union votes cast by each member on the 
vertical axis and the years in which the votes were cast on the horizontal axis. It also lists 
each member‟s background in front of her/his name. GA stands for government or 
academia, M for management, and U for union. Figure 16 includes the name, political 
party affiliations, and the background of each board member in our study period. 
Furthermore, it shows how many years (each knot represent a year) each member served 
on the board and his/her voting patterns during his/her tenure. Members Browning, Fox, 
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Liebman, and Walsh, who are Democrats from union backgrounds, and served 4 or more 
years on the board, have the highest percentage (more than 90 percent) of pro-union votes 
among all members. Their combined votes account for 35 percent of all votes. Members 
Battista, Cohen, Hurtgen, and Schaumber have the lowest percentage (less than 50 
percent) of pro-union votes among all board members. They are Republicans from 
management backgrounds
10
 and served 3 or more years on the board. 
Their votes account for 31 percent of all votes. The years matter here, because the 
longer a member served on the board the higher her/his share of the vote. This, in turn, 
reveals the overall pattern of a board member‟s voting behavior considering her/his 
background, political party affiliation, and voting record. Figure 16 also shows some 
extreme voting behavior. For example, Browning, a Democrat with a union background, 
voted 100 percent pro-union and Bartlett and Cowen, two Republicans from management 
backgrounds, voted zero percent pro-union.  
Twenty-one board members served on the NLRB during the 1993-2008 period. 
Ten board members came from a management background, seven members from 
government or academia, and four members from a union background. Two hundred and 
forty-two votes were cast by board members from management backgrounds, 245 votes 
by board members from government or academic backgrounds, and 263 votes by 
members with union backgrounds. Figure 17 demonstrates the total votes and pro-union 
votes of the board members. Pro-union votes as a percentage of total votes by the board 
members vary from a low of 38 percentage points to a high of 94 percentage points, with 
board members from government and academia in between with 62 percentage points. 
                                                          
10
 Member Schaumber‟s background is not clear, therefore we assume him as government and academia 
background in our analysis. 
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Board members from management backgrounds had the highest number of members on 
the board during this period, the lowest number of votes, and the highest percentage of 
promanagement votes in this period. Government and academia had the second highest 
number of members, second highest percentage votes pro-union, and the second highest 
number of votes. Members with union backgrounds had the lowest number of board 
members, the highest number of votes, and the highest percentage of pro-union votes. 
These statistics delineate that board member‟s background played a crucial role in their 
voting behavior; however, it does not tell us about other factors that influence the voting 
behavior of the board member. Previous studies pointed out that economic conditions, the 
political party of the appointing president, and the administrative law judge ruling, were 
all related to the voting behavior of the board member. However, background as a 
determinant of voting behavior was not included in their empirical studies.
11
 The 
following section will introduce the empirical model that is used to incorporate all 
relevant determinants of voting behavior of the board.  
    
Empirical Model 
     The empirical model we use is a logistic regression:  
 
      itccitcitcitcitcitc eCXPPLnYLogit  1/)1(  
 
Y is a dichotomous variable and equals 1 if a board member votes in favor of unions and 
equals zero if the member votes promanagement. P is the probability of Y being equal to 
one and (1-P) is the probability of Y being equal to zero. Ln [Pit /(1- Pit )] is the natural 
log of odds of Y,  α is the intercept, β is a vector of logit coefficient corresponding to 
                                                          
11
 Cooke and Gautschi (1982) used a management background variable in their model. 
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explanatory variables, X is a vector of explanatory variables, C captures case‟s fixed 
effect, and ℮ is the residual. The subscript i stands for the ith board member, t is the year 
of the decision, and c stands for the ULP cases. Vector X includes board member‟s 
background, the party of the board member, the party of the appointing administration, 
the majority of the political party on the panel, the recess appointee, the unemployment 
rate, the average senate votes, RTW states, and case originated state. 
 The analysis uses pro-union votes that were cast by the NLRB board member 
with ULP cases as its dependent variable. This variable is derived from those novel cases 
reported by the NLRB annual report and can be accessed at www.nlrb,gov/annual-
reports.  
 The independent variables, which are listed in Table 17, are defined as follows: 
 
Member‟s background   
Out of 21 board members during this study period, there were 10 board members 
from management backgrounds,
12
 seven board members from government or academia, 
and four board members from union backgrounds.   
Board member‟s background has been a source of controversy for many decades. 
When Congress formed the NLRB in 1935, it visualized a board consisting of impartial 
members of the government (Flynn, 2000). The early board members were drawn from 
government members or other neutral backgrounds such as academia. However, as we 
mentioned in the literature review, the trend in neutral backgrounds of the Board 
                                                          
12
 Kirsanow (Management lawyer, http://www.usccr.gov/cos/bio/kirsanow.htm, accessed 4/29/2011, 
accessed 4/29/2011). Meisburg (Management lawyer, http://www.nlrb.gov/search/nlrbsearch/Meisburg, 
accessed 4/29/2011). Battista (Management, http://www.nlrb.gov/search/nlrbsearch/battista, accessed 




appointees was broken by President Eisenhower in the 1950s. According to Flynn, this 
change, although it was originally controversial, later became the norm. Board members‟ 
backgrounds up until the 1980s might not have played a big role since both sides of the 
political spectrum showed restraint in their choices of board nominees.  Board members‟ 
backgrounds became more relevant as more moderate nominees from both political 
parties were denied appointment to the board after the 1980s.   
Flynn (2000) provides some insight into the polarization of the board members‟ 
voting on ULP cases for two different periods. Period one covers 1955-1979 and period 
two covers 1985-2000. The comparison of these two periods shows that the board 
members‟ votes became more skewed towards either union or management in the second 
period depending on the board members‟ backgrounds. Tables 18 and 19, which are 
derived from Flynn (2000), show that the number of board members from a government 
and academic background has dropped from 13 in the period of 1955-1979 to only six in 
1980-2000 and the number of board members from a management background has 
increased from five to nine for the same period. Not only the composition of the board 
members‟ backgrounds has changed from pre-1980 to after the 1980s, but also the board 
members‟ voting behavior has experienced change from one period into another. 
Flynn (2000) divided the board members into two groups, pro-union and pro-
management. The pro-union group included members who voted on average more than 
50 percent in favor of unions. The promanagement group included board members whose 
votes averaged more than 50 percent promanagement. We further divided each group into 
three subgroups with respect to their backgrounds. Board members with a government or 
academic background on average voted 63 percent pro-union (eight out of 13, seven 
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Democrats and one Republican) and 60 percent promanagement (five out of 13, four 
Republicans and one Democrat) in the first period. In the second period, on average 70 
percent of government or academia votes were pro-union (three Democrats and two 
Republicans) and 59 percent promanagement (one Republican). Board members with a 
management background voted 54 percent pro-union (one Democrat) and 64.5 percent 
promanagement (three Republicans and one independent) in the pre-1980s. After 1980, 
members with a management background on average voted 75 percent pro-union (two 
Democrats and one Republican) and 85.5 percent promanagement (six Republicans). 
Members with a union background were not represented in the first period
13
 and the 
second period included three members with a union background who on average voted 94 
percent pro-union (three Democrats).  
These statistics show that board members‟ voting behavior in ULP cases changed 
in the second period and became more skewed towards unions or management. The 
composition of board members‟ background also changed and became more a mixture of 
management or unions from government and academia. We believe that a board 
member‟s political party affiliation alone cannot capture the variations in ideology that 
existed among board members from the same political party. Members, within a political 
party, may differ in their views by being moderate or to the left or the right. Therefore, 
political party affiliation of the board member cannot capture the degree to which a board 
member‟s vote is impacted by her/his background. The distribution of votes among three 
backgrounds does not vary much and are as follows. Thirty-three percent of the votes 
were cast by government and academia, 32 percent by management, and 35 percent by 
                                                          
13
 In the period of 1955-1979, Flynn (2000) indicated one member who was from both management and 
union background. We did not include that member. 
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the members from union backgrounds (Table 20). We expected the board members with 
union backgrounds to disproportionately cast pro-union votes, members with 
management backgrounds to disproportionately cast promanagement votes, and we used 
government/academia as our base.  
 
Member party  
A board member‟s political party affiliation was found to influence the member‟s 
voting behavior on ULP cases in the past. Empirical studies in the past found that the 
board members from the Democratic Party were more likely to vote pro-union than the 
members of the Republican Party. Since all board members, listed in Table 16, are 
affiliated with one of the two major political parties, we used a dichotomous variable 
equaling one for Democrat and zero for Republican. The NLRB reports all board 
members‟ political party affiliations, which can be accessed at 
(www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/board/board_members_since_1935.aspx).  
 
Party of administration   
A board member appointed by the President is subject to the Senate‟s 
confirmation. Members that are appointed by a Democratic President are more likely to 
vote pro-union (Delorme, 1981). This study uses a dichotomous variable for the party of 
the administration. It equals one if the board member is appointed by a Democratic 
President and zero if s/he is appointed by a Republican President. We expect a positive 






Administrative Law Judge  
According to Cooke and Gautschi (1982), a ULP complaint carries more weight 
in a board member‟s decision if the complaint is sustained by an ALJ, rather than a case 
that was rejected by the ALJ. Our data show that 67 percent of the ALJ‟s ruling were in 
favor of unions and this is slightly higher than the 65 percent pro-union votes for all the 
members of the board. In order to control for the influence of the ALJ‟s decision on a 
board member‟s vote, we created a dichotomous variable, which we call “pro-unionAlj.” 
Pro-unionAlj equals one if the ALJ‟s ruling is pro-union and zero otherwise. We expect a 
positive relationship between this variable and a pro-union vote. 
 
Trend  
A trend variable is used here to control for the year of the decision, 1993-2008. 
  
Recess  
A report by the NLRB, which can be accessed at (http://www.nlrb.gov/members-
nlrb-1935), shows that recess appointments to the board started in 1982 under President 
Reagan.  Then, the second and the third recess appointments occurred in 1988, which 
marked the beginning of more routine recess appointments thereafter. The first recess 
appointment began with the nomination of Van de Water. According to Flynn, Van de 
Water was a staunch anti-union management consultant, who was a proud victor in 125 
of 130 anti-union campaigns. His nomination was blocked in the Senate Labor 
Committee by a tie vote. Recess appointments are a way in which the President shows 
her/his disagreement with some members of the Senate on their choice of nominee to the 
NLRB. It is not clear whether their disagreements center on the nominees or some other 
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unresolved issue that leads to such disagreement. According to Flynn, the Senate labor 
committee not only refuses to confirm moderate NLRB nominees, but recently became 
more intrusive in the process of selecting nominees. During the study period, there were 
11 board members appointed during the Senate recess. Two recess appointees were from 
government and academia, six from management, and three from union backgrounds. Six 
out of the 11 recess appointments were at some time confirmed by the Senate, before or 
after their recess appointments. Five members were confirmed during our study period. 
We created a dummy variable, which equals one if the board member is a recess 
appointee in the year of decision making and has never been confirmed by the Senate 
during the study period. We expect this variable to be negatively related to a prolabor 
vote, because all board members, who were recess appointees and have not been 
confirmed by the Senate during our study period, are Republicans.  
 
Unemployment rate  
Previous studies used the unemployment rate to determine whether a member‟s 
voting behavior was affected by economic conditions. The results for the unemployment 
rate depended on the member‟s perception of economic conditions (Delorme et al., 
1981). High unemployment may cause sympathy towards labor, hence a pro-union vote, 
and a low unemployment rate with a rise in general prices would negatively affect 
member‟s decisions. We speculate a positive relationship between unemployment rates 






Panel majority  
Cooke et al. (1995) stated that a panel majority with respect to political party 
affiliations may insert influence on an individual board member or on the minority party 
of the panel. For instance, the minority on the panel may seek majority approval or the 
evidence in the case may not warrant a dissenting view from the minority. However, a 
competing hypothesis indicates that the minority may want to emphasize their own views 
and may believe an added persistence is needed if they are to challenge the majority 
view. Cooke et al. (1995) concluded that their results partially supported the notion that 
the minority persist on their pro-union or promanagement views. Republican members 
were more likely to vote promanagement when they were in the minority. We do not 
speculate any prior outcome for this variable. 
Equation 1 is estimated using logit analysis for 1993-2008. We estimate two 
models that differ in terms of explanatory variables. Model one includes all our 
independent variables that were listed in Table 17. Model two excludes member‟s 
political party affiliation due to some technical issues that are explained in the next 
section. Model one explores the importance of board member‟s backgrounds in the 
presence of member‟s political party affiliations. Model two is employed to overcome 




Table 21 reports the results of two logit models for voting on ULP cases by 
NLRB members between 1993 and 2008. In model one, we included board member‟s 
background, their political party affiliations, the party of appointing administration, 
ALJ‟s ruling, trend, recess appointment, unemployment rate, and panel majority.  
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As we expected, board member‟s background along with their political party 
affiliations are related to voting on ULP cases and their coefficients are statistically 
significant with the anticipated signs. The odds of a board member voting pro-union is 
positively related to a union background and negatively related to a management 
background relative to the base. The coefficient for the union background is statistically 
significant at the .01 level. This result implies that a board member with a union 
background compared to a board member from a government or academic background is 
significantly more likely to vote pro-union, even after controlling for his/her political 
party affiliation. The issue of a member‟s background was raised by Flynn (2000) due to 
a change in the process of board member nominations after 1980. Furthermore, Tables 18 
and 19 show a significant reduction in the number of board members from government 
and academic backgrounds, and an increase in management and union backgrounds after 
the 1980s in comparison to the earlier period. The board not only had more members with 
management and union background than before the 1980s, but also members‟ voting 
behaviors gravitated to one side or the other. Although the coefficient for management 
background is not statistically significant, it has the right sign. This might be due to a 
high variance inflation factor (VIF) for this variable in this model (greater than 5) and a 
high VIF for member‟s political party (Tables 22 and 23), which led us to run a second 
model that we will discuss next. Member‟s political party affiliation is an important 
determinant of the board‟s voting behavior and its coefficient is statistically significant at 
the .01 level. Democrats are more likely to vote pro-union than Republicans and this 
result is consistent with the reports by earlier empirical studies. The ALJ‟s ruling is also 
related to pro-union vote in this model and its coefficient is highly significant at the .05 
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level. This result means that the log of the odds of the ALJ ruling is positively related to 
pro-union votes and reflects the 67 percent pro-union votes by the ALJ in that period. 
Previous studies used interaction variables with respect to the influence of the ALJ‟s 
ruling and they were not comparable to our proxy. Other variables such as appointing 
party, the unemployment rate, recess appointment, and the majority on the panel did not 
significantly impact pro-union votes and their coefficients are not statistically significant. 
The result for the unemployment rate in our model differs with those by Delorme et al. 
(1981) and Cooke et al. (1995). Those studies found unemployment rates to be positively 
related to pro-union votes and its coefficient was statistically significant. Delorme et al. 
(1981) did not include the majority on the panel and Cooke et al. (1995) used this 
variable in interaction with political party affiliations, which resulted in a partial effect on 
a board member‟s voting behavior, in that the panel majority was more relevant to the 
Republican board members and it had no effects on Democratic board members. Recess 
appointment was not included in any of the earlier studies and it was created for this 
study to capture the effects of those members who were appointees by two presidents and 
have not been confirmed by the Senate. This variable did not impact pro-union votes and 
might be influenced by two issues. First, there were only four members of the board that 
did not receive confirmations and their total votes were very small in comparison to total 
votes. Second, their confirmation may have been influenced by disagreements between 
the president and the Senate and not their credentials.  
Model two differs from Model one, in that it does not include a member‟s 
political party affiliation. There are two reasons for excluding a member‟s political party 
affiliations from model two. First, a member‟s political party in model one carries a VIF 
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greater than seven, which is larger than five (VIF = 5 our upper limit). Second, its effect 
is captured by a member‟s background and party affiliations and appointing president in 
our model. By excluding a member‟s political party in model two, both the coefficients 
for management background and the party of the appointing president become 
statistically significant and are larger in their magnitudes. 
Results for model two shows that union background, management background, 
political party of the appointing president, and ALJ‟s ruling are all related to pro-union 
votes and their coefficients are statistically significant at the .10 and .01 levels. Political 
party of the appointing president and management background did not significantly affect 
pro-union votes in model one; however, they were highly related to pro-union votes in 
model two and their coefficients were statistically significant at the .10 and .01, 
respectively. These differences may have been due to the problem of multicolinearity that 
we observed in model one.  
 What does all this mean? These results show that a board member‟s background 
has a significant impact on a board member‟s voting behavior on ULP cases and implies 
that board members‟ backgrounds must be considered in empirical models as a 
determinant of board member voting behavior on ULP cases. Furthermore, our results for 
other variables, the party of appointing administration, and the ALJ‟s ruling, are 
consistent with previous studies and have a large impact on pro-union votes. We also 
included other variables, as was suggested by Cooke et al. (1995). For example, we 
included an AFL-CIO COPE variable (a measure for public accountability of the board 
members), a dummy variable for the cases that originated in a RTW state (a measure for 
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employer image), and GDP (a measure of economic activities); however, these variables 
did not produce any significant effects on pro-union votes in our models.    
A policy implication of this study is that the NLRA needs changes to overcome 
criticism by unions and employers. These changes should address all three issues that 
were raised at the beginning of this paper: more comprehensive language of the labor 
laws, a uniform intention by law makers with respect to collective bargaining or 
individual rights, and appointment and confirmation of board members that are respected 
by both sides, and are more likely to vote on the merit of a case and not be influenced by 
their background and the political party of the appointing president. Our results showed 
that board members from government and academia on average voted 62 percent pro-
union, which lies between 38 and 94 percent for management and union, respectively. 
One conclusion from these results is that board members from union background are 
more likely to vote pro-union than their counterparts relative to government employees 
and academicians. However, it is difficult to draw additional analysis without detailed 
information on individual cases. Another observation from these results is that ALJ and 
board members‟ pro-union votes from government and academic background were 
similar for this period. ALJs and board members from government and academic 
backgrounds on average voted 67 and 62 percent pro-union in this period. This result 
might be just a coincidence, or it implies a relationship between voting behavior of ALJs 
and those board members that requires further research.  
Unions believe that an amendment to the NLRA is needed to overcome some of 
these criticisms. They have tried to amend the NLRA through the US Congress; however, 





 This paper has utilized two logit regression models in order to assess factors 
influencing NLRB board members‟ voting behaviors on ULP cases. Results obtained 
here from two regressions confirm previous studies that board members‟ political party 
affiliations, the party of the appointing administration, and ALJ rulings influence voting 
behaviors of the board members. Additional variables, recess and member‟s background, 
were employed to capture changes in the process of the board member nomination, which 
has emerged since the 1980s. The recess variable did not meet our expectations and had 
no significant impact on the pro-union votes. Results for this variable might have been 
influenced by the low vote counts for these recess members during our study period 
compared to the total votes. Board member‟s background, on the other hand, turned out 
to be a very important determinant of pro-union votes. This variable not only accounts for 
board members‟ political party, but also measures the level to which a board member is 
affected by his/her background. Board members from the same political party, but from 
different backgrounds, voted differently on ULP cases. The background issue may not 
have been relevant to the previous empirical studies, because their data came from earlier 
periods. Board members background became relevant after the 1980s, when the Senate 
became more pro-active and took over some of the president‟s roles in the selection 
phase. As was reported by Flynn (2000), a member‟s union or management background 
became increasingly important determinants of votes in favor of union or management. 
Our results also show that board member‟s background played crucial roles in voting on 




Table 15: Unfair Labor Practice Cases 1993-2008 
Type of Cases No. of Cases % of Total 
Cases 
Comments 
Total Cases reviewed 295 100.0  
Union against employer 220 74.6  
Employer against union  21 7.1  
Employee against union and employer 52 17.6 Excluded 
Union vs. union 







Total Unclear Cases  





Employee against union and employer 







  Total cases used in the model                                   223 75.6 Remaining cases 
Data Source: Derived from NLRB annual reports 
Table 16: Board Members‟ Voting Record, Party Affiliations, and Background (1993-
2008) 




Member Party         Background 
Acosta    50    12 Republican Gov. or Acad. 
Bartlett 0 3 Republican Management 
Battista 28 85 Republican Management 
Brame 60 10 Republican Management 
Browning 100 30 Democrat Union 
Cohen 48 27 Republican Management 
Cowen      0      4 Republican Management 
Devaney 89 28 Democrat  Gov. or Acad. 
Fox 92 38 Democrat Union 
Gould 79 52 Democrat  Gov. or Acad. 
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Table 17: Variables and their Definitions. 
Variable Definition                               
    
Uback Equals to one if the board member is from a union 





Equals to one if the board member is from a union 
background and zero otherwise. 
 
  
GAback Is our base and equals to one if the board member is 









Equals to one if the board member is a Democrat and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Equals to one if the appointing President is a 













Equals to one if the ALJ‟s ruling is pro-union and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Equals to one if the period is from 1993 to2000 and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Equals to one if the Board member is a recess 
appointee and has not been confirmed by the Senate 





National unemployment rate in the year of voting. 
Equals to one if the panel majority is Democrats and 
zero otherwise 
  
    
    








Table 18: NLRB Voting Records 1955-1979 







Govt. & Acad. 13 62 (7D+R) 60 (4R+D) 
Mgt 5 54 (D) 64.5 (3R+ind) 
Union 0 0 0 
Data Source: Flynn (2000), table 1 
Table 19: NLRB Voting Records 1980-2000 







Govt. & Acad. 6 70 (3D+2R) 59 (R) 
Mgt 9 75 (2D+R) 85.5 (6R) 
Union 3 94 (3D) 0 
Data Source: Flynn (2000), table 2 
Table 20: Background and Votes Cast on ULP Cases 1993-2008 
Background Total votes cast Percent of Total Recess votes 
Government and Academia 245 33 38 
Management  242 32 53 
Union 263 35 55 
Total 750 100 146 













Table 21: Results for Pro-union Votes on ULP Cases 1993-2008 
Variables Model 1                   Model 2  
    
Uback 6.1782               5.9395  
 (1.778)***            (1.692)***  
Mback -0.7614               -4.2883  
 (1.243)                   
(0.958)*** 
 
Memberparty 6.3030   
 (1.738)***   
Appointingparty 0.491                 1.9609  
 (1.251)                     
(1.051)* 
 
Pro-UAlj 4.3064               3.3674  
 (1.604)***                   
(1.243)*** 
 
Trend -0.5010                -0.2598  
 (0.223)**                 (0.185)  
Mrecess 0.2234                 -0.5917  
 (1.266)                 (1.145)  
Unemp rate -0.611                -0.0324  
 (1.246)                (1.077)  
Panel-Democrat -0.5935               -0.5296  
 (1.716)                (1.469)  
Cons 1002.9500               520.9672  
 (451.425)**                     
(375.773) 
 
    












Table 22: Variance Inflation Factor for Model 1 
Variable      VIF  Tolerance R-Squared 
Uback      2.77      0.3613 0.6387 
Mback 6.32 0.1583 0.8417 
Memberparty 7.22 0.1385 0.8615 
Appointingparty  2.54 0.3938 0.6062 
Pro-UAlj 1.04 0.9594 0.0406 
Year 3.13 0.3191 0.6809 
Mrecess      1.14      0.8801      0.1199 
Unemp 2.42 0.4131 0.5869 
PanelD 1.97 0.5081 0.4919 
Total 3.00   
 
Table 23: Variance Inflation Factor for Model 2 
Variable      VIF  Tolerance R-Squared 
Uback     2.62     0.3810     0.3023 
Mback 2.61 0.3831 0.6190 
Appointingparty  2.34 0.4277 0.5723 
Pro-UAlj 1.04 0.9599 0.0401 
Year 2.97 0.3362 0.6638 
Mrecess     1.08     0.9274     0.0726 
Unemp 2.41 0.4146 0.5854 
PanelD 1.97 0.5081 0.4919 
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 This dissertation, which contains three essays, explores the factors that influenced 
unionization in the US. The period between 1980 and 2008 was chosen, because this 
period represents the worst period for union membership rates since the Great Depression 
and was not adequately covered by other studies. Each of the three essays explores a 
specific section of the US trade unions and made contributions to the existing literature. 
The following paragraphs report the findings of each essay. 
Essay one examined the factors that caused variations in the US private sector 
union density at the state and state-industry levels in 1985, 1995, and 2005 by utilizing 
OLS and 2SLS regression analysis. State-industry level analysis is unique to this paper 
and revealed details on industry and unionization that were different from the analysis at 
the state level. Furthermore, it used a decomposition method to account for the decline in 
union density over time. The decomposition method showed that overall endowment 
effects at the state-industry level were positive over this period and the coefficient effects 
were negative, which led to a net decline in union density. In addition, it showed that the 
determinants of unionization had different impacts on union density in different periods.  
At the state-industry level, our results showed that union density was positively 
determined by the level of earnings, share of blue-collar workers in the labor force, union 
activism, and urban areas. Unionization is found to be negatively impacted by female 
share, management opposition, and RTW laws. Other variables in the model do not 
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produce consistent signs or their impacts are not statistically significant. Regions, 
according to our analysis, play a significant role. We found, for instance, the Midwest 
region is more likely to be unionized than the Southern region of the country. These 
results might be due to more favorable labor laws in the Midwestern region compared to 
the South. Our state-industry level analysis also shows that industries exhibit strong 
results for all four regressions. Some industries such as utility, transportation, and 
communications have greater impact on unionization than others such as durable and 
retail. Furthermore, two out of three new measures of union and management behavior, 
which we introduce in this paper, significantly impacted union density across states and 
over time. Management opposition negatively affected union density during the entire 
period and its coefficient was statistically significant at .05 level. An increase in 
management opposition led to a decline in union density. Union activism, another 
variable introduced in this paper, positively impacted unionization during the study 
period and its coefficient was statistically significant at .01 level. Unions can help to raise 
the levels of their membership by actively organizing new members. The results for these 
two variables met our expectations and are consistent with the literature. The Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition method showed that the overall contribution of the endowment 
portion of the decomposition for the state-industry was 6.64 percent. However, the effects 
of the coefficients (unexplained portion) have been larger and negative, which led to a net 
decline in union density for these periods. Average earning is a positive contributor in the 
endowment effects and blue-collar workers, union activism, and employer oppositions 
are negative contributors. In the coefficient effects, female share and union activism are 
positive contributors. The biggest single negative contributor to the unexplained portion 
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is the intercept or the shift, which is minus 28.31 percent. Overall, our model confirms 
the finding of the previous studies for determinants of unionization and more importantly, 
it verifies our choice of proxies for employer opposition and union activism. 
Essay two took a different approach to examine the recent history of public sector 
unionization in two intermountain states. A comparison of Colorado and Utah was 
chosen because these states have many similarities in their determinants of unionization 
known to the empirical studies. These determinants include region, state labor laws, and 
private sector unionization. However, they experienced a very different history of change 
in their public sector union density between 1983 and 2008. Data showed that most of the 
changes in the public sector union density occurred in Utah, while Colorado to some 
extent mimicked the national averages. The analysis of this paper showed that the factors 
that have led to the decline in the public sector union membership in Utah, which was 
higher at the beginning of the study period and lower at the end, were to a lesser extent 
due to economic factors, composition of the labor force, and union activities. More 
importantly, the decline in the public sector union density in Utah compared with 
Colorado was due to changes in public attitudes in Utah, which led to a super majority 
control of government by the Republican Party in that state. All three branches of the 
government in Utah were controlled by the Republican Party during the study period, 
whereas Colorado‟s Republican Party did not have the same advantage during this 
period. Republicans in office have consistently favored business over labor as was 
indicated by their voting records on issues that matter to labor and were recorded by 
AFL-CIO COPE. Republican super majority in Utah led to greater management 
resistance towards unions than in Colorado. The Paycheck Deduction Act was an 
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example of the comparison between these states. Utah‟s public unions declined at a faster 
rate than Colorado due to stiffer opposition from public management in that state.  
The third essay assessed factors that assumed to influence NLRB voting behavior 
on ULP cases, which are related to private sector unionization and have an effect on 
union membership. This empirical study utilized two logit regressions and expanded on 
previous empirical studies. The results obtained not only confirmed previous studies 
conclusions, but also confirmed our newly introduced variables for the board member‟s 
background. It showed that the party of the appointing administration and ALJ rulings 
influence voting behaviors of the board members, and these results are consistent with 
previous findings.  Furthermore, the member‟s background proved to be an important 
determinant of the pro-union votes in this period, which differed from the earlier period. 
Board members with a management background were negatively related to the pro-union 
votes, and members with a union background were positively related to pro-union votes. 
On average 38 percent of the votes cast by board members with management 
backgrounds were pro-union, and 94 percent of the votes were by board members with 
union backgrounds. Board members with government and academic backgrounds voted 
on average 62 percent pro-union, which was slightly lower than the percentage vote by 
ALJs at 67 percent. These statistics and the regression analysis showed that board 
members‟ backgrounds profoundly affected board members‟ voting behavior on ULP 
cases. Previous studies showed that board members‟ political party affects their voting 
behavior on ULP cases; however, they could not capture the degree to which a board 
member is affected by political ideology. Board members from the same political party, 
but from different backgrounds, voted differently on ULP cases. In addition, our results 
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show that the board members background played a crucial role in voting on the ULP 
cases even after controlling for board members‟ political party affiliations in our first 
model, and other variables that have an effect on members voting behavior. 
The three essays in this dissertation are related in many aspects. They are all 
related to unions and unionization. They share common themes such as the period of 
coverage, employer opposition, and labor laws. Most importantly, they lead to similar 
conclusions. Union membership can be greatly improved by comprehensive labor laws 
that reflect the need of the market and are fair to all market participants. For instance, the 
results for essay one showed that RTW laws are negatively related to union density and 
states with such laws have lower unionization. Lack of collective bargaining laws opens 
the door for conflict between management and public employees representative in a state, 
as we indicated in essay two. States with comprehensive collective bargaining laws are 
more unionized than states without such laws. Essay three showed that the vague 
language or unclear intention of the law makers also opened the door for different 
interpretations of the laws depending on one‟s background or political party affiliations. 
Vague or inadequate labor laws may lead to more employer opposition. Labor laws 
should periodically be updated to meet the changes in a dynamic labor market such as the 
US labor market. As of this writing, most of the laws that govern the US labor markets 
are outdated and ripe for renewal. Most importantly, the laws that govern collective 
bargaining needs to be amended or changed. In 1978, the US Congress came very close 
to updating the NLRA; however, that effort was filibustered in the end. There is a similar 
bill under consideration “Employee Free Choice Act” that would amend the NLRA and 
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